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B-PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
HUBER'S DE CONFLICTU LEGUM1 
BY ERNEST G. LoRENZEN2 
Of the vast number of treatises on the Conflict of Laws Huber's 
"De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis"3 is the 
shortest It covers only five quarto pages; and yet it has had a 
greater influence upon the development of the Conflict of Laws in 
England and the United States than any other work. No other 
foreign work has been so frequently cited. Story himself relied 
upon Huber more than upon any of the other foreign jurists. 
Indeed, Laine4 goes so far as to say that Story's celebrated work 
on the '~Conflict of Laws" is in reality nothing but a "paraphrase'' 
of Huber. 
In the estimation of continental jurists, Huber does not occupy 
such a prominent position. He is considered one of the lesser 
writers on the subject. Whence comes this difference in the ap-
preciation of Huber? Before this question is answered it will be 
1. "Ulrich Huber was descended from a Swiss family. His grand-
father entered the military service of The Netherlands. Ulrich was born 
at Dokkum in 1636. He studied at the universities of Franeker and Utrecht. 
In 1657 he became professor of law at the University of Franeker. He was 
twice offered the chair of law at Leyden, but refused each time. He was 
afterwards appointed as a member of the Provincial Court at Leeuwaarden, 
but shortly before his death he retur.ned to Franeker. He died in 1694, or 
four years before Voet published his Commentary. 
"Ulrich Huber was regarded as one of the first rank in the Dutch 
school of law. His principal works are "De Jure Civitatis"; "Praelectiones 
Juris Civilis" ; "Digressiones J ustinianae" ; "Eunomia Romana" ; and the 
"Hedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt zoo elders als in Frieslandt gebruikelyk." 
In addition to these works he wrote a considerable number of works on theo-
logical and philosophical subjects": Wessels, "History of the Roman-Dutch 
Law," 316-17. . 
2. [Born April 21, 1876; Ph.B., Cornell, 1898, LL.B. 1899; studied at 
~cole de Droit, Ecole libre des Sciences Politiques, Paris, and at Heidelberg 
and Gottingen; J. U. D. "maxima cum laude," Gottingen, 1901 ; practiced 
law at New York, 1901-3; professor of law, University of Maine, 1903-4; 
professor of law, 1904-11, dean 1910-11, George Washington University; 
professor of law, University of Wisconsin, 1911-14; professor of law, Uni-
versity of Minnesota, 1914-17; now professor of law at Yale University. He 
is a member of many American and foreign learned societies and commit-
tees; and is author of numerous writings, especially in the fields of con-
flict of laws and comparative law. His articles have appeared in many of 
the important American and European law reviews.-En.] 
3. It constitutes a part of title 3, part 2, book 1, of Hubers "Praelec-
tionum juris <:ivilis, tomi tres." 
4. Clunet, Journal du droit international prive, XXIII, 486. 
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profitable_ to set forth very briefly Huber's views on the subject of 
the Conflict of Laws and to compare them with the views of the 
other leading statutists. 
I 
Huber has formulated his views concerning the legal basis upon 
which, in his opinion, the rules of the Conflict of Laws rest in the 
following three maxims: 
1. The laws of each state have force within the limits of that 
government and Jbind all subjects to it, but not beyond. 
2. All persons within th~ limits of a government, whether 
they live there permanently or temporarily, are deemed to be sub-
jects thereof. 
3. Sovereigns will so act by way of comity that rights acquired 
within the limits of a government retain their force everywhere 
so far as they do not cause prejudice to the powers or rights of such 
government or of their subjects. 
Maxims one and two announce the doctrine that all laws are 
territorial, that they have no force and effect ex proprio vigore 
beyond the limits of the enacting state, but bind all found within 
the territory. In thus proclaiming in such unqualified terms· the 
territoriality of all laws Huber went beyond any of his predecessors. 
The writers belonging to the Italian school5 wrote at a time when 
feudalism was losing its foothold in the respective countries in 
which they wrote, and the modem doctrine of territorial sovereignty 
had not yet developed. The questions did not relate to the ·con-
flicting laws of independent states. In Italy they arose between the 
various local city laws and the Roman law which governed through-
out the peninsula as a general common law. In France they arose 
between the different provincial ''customs" of one and the same 
state. To limi~ the operation of laws to the confines of the state or 
province in which they had originated appeared, under such con-
ditions, to be both unnatural and unnecessary. Following the 
tradition of the old Germanic law, some laws were deemed to fol-
5. "The Italian doctrine consisted at first in the sketches, gradually gain-
ing in clearness and certainty, of Durant, Belleperche, Cinus, and Fabre. It 
was thereupon enlarged, developed and complicated through the writings of 
Bartolus, and later enriched through additions from Baldus and Salicet. 
During the entire fifteenth century and a part of the sixteenth, in the hands 
of Paul de Castre, Alexander, Rochus Curtius in Italy, and Masuer, Chasse-
neuz, and Tiraqueau in France, it remained stationary. Dumoulin, at last, 
gave to it new life and a new impetus when d' Argentre arrested the move-
ment and replaced it with a new theory": Laine, "Introduction au Droit 
international prive," I, 250-51. 
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low the person wherever he went; whereas others were regarded as 
having merely a local effect. Neither the Italian writers, nor the 
French writers belonging to the Italian school, attempted, how-
ever, to define with precision which of the statutes would have 
extra-territorial effect and which would not.6 
I.n Brittany, feudalism had maintained itself more strongly 
than in any other of the French provinces. Inspired by these 
feudal ideas, d' Argentre contended that "all customs are real," that 
is, territorial. In one respect, ho_wever, this courageous Britton 
yielded to the traditional view. The rule that the status and 
capacity of a person has extra-territorial effect had become so 
thoroughly established in France through the influence of the 
Italian schoo!, that d' Argentre accepted the same as an exception 
to his general theory ; but he attempted to confine it within narrow 
limits.7 
The new doctrine formulated by d' Argentre did not fall upon 
a receptive ground in France, and for a century and more it was 
not accepted there. Feudalism was disappearing and there was no 
inclination to emphasize the differences in the laws of the various 
provinces. 
In Holland conditions were different. The Dutch provinces had 
just gained !their independence and formed a federation. But this 
federation affected but little the independence of the individual 
provinces in which there existed an intense jealousy of their local 
rights. This condition coupled with the fact that a growing com-
merce with foreign: nations caused them to look upon the Conflict 
of Laws as arising between separate political sovereignties, led them 
to accept most readily d'Argentre's doctrine of the territoriality of 
all customs. A new school of jurists arose, represented by Paul 
Voet, Huber, and John Voet, which carried d'Argentre's doctrine 
to its logical conclusion. It declined to recognize any exception to 
the rule that laws have ipso jure no extra-territorial operation. Ac-
cording to these writers all extra-territorial effect of laws rested 
solely upon comity. Paul Voet was the first to lay down his new 
doctrine, without developing it. He did not even present it ~s some-
thing new, and supported his statement that all laws are territorial 
by reference to the older writers.8 His son, John Voet, on the con-
trary, was fully aware of the fact that the views set forth involved 
6. Laine, "Introduction au droit international prive," I, 248 et seq. 
7. D'Argentrfi, "Commentarii in patrias britonum leges," art. 218, glosse 
6, n. 2, 3, 9, 11. See discussion of status and capacity, infra. 
8. P. Voet, "De Statutis," s. 4, c. 2, n. 7. 
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a radical departure from those expressed by d' Argentre, whose 
views he vigorously assailed.9 Twenty years before the publica-
tion of John Voet's great work on the Pandects, in which the lat-
ter's treatment of the Conflict of Laws is found, Huber had an-
nounced the doctrine of the Dutch school in the clearest and most 
unmistakable language, and had made it the foundation of his 
treatise on the subject under discussion. 
Comity. Huber's third maxim indicates that the "sovereign" of 
a state may "by way of comity" recognize rights acquired under the 
laws of another state. Huber was the first writer who made it clear 
beyond a doubt, that the recognition in each state of so-called for-
eign created rights was a mere concession which such state ·made 
on grounds of convenience and utility, and not as the result of a 
binding obligation or duty. From the wording of the maxim it 
would appear that Huber conceived of comity as a political con-
cession which might be granted or withheld arbitrarily by the sov-
ereign. He adds, however, that the solution of the problem is to 
be derived "not exclusively from the civil law but from convenience 
and the tacit consent of nations."10 What convenience and the 
tacit consent of nations might prescribe was evidently a question for 
the courts, and so the term "comity" came soon to be understood as 
judicial comity.11 
Public Policy. In his third maxim the limits beyond which the 
recognition of foreign laws cannot go are also stated. In Huber"s 
words they can be recognized only "so far as they do not cause 
prejudice to the power or rights of such government or of their 
subjects."12 In other places he adds that such recognition will be 
denied if it would be revolting to accord it,l8 or if there has been an 
evasion of the locallaw.14 
APPLICATION OF HuBER's MAxiMS 
Status and Capacity in General. With reference to status and 
ca!pacity the greatest difference of opinion has existed among the 
different writers. Those belonging to the Italian school applied the 
law of the domicile. They gave to such law extra-territorial opera-
9. J. Voet, "Ad Pandectas," bk. 1, tit. 4, pt. 2, n. 5, 7. 
10. Huber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 2. 
11. Catellani, "Il diritto internazionale privato e i suoi recenti progressi,'' 
II, 455-56. 
12. See also Huber, "Praelect.," pt 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 3, 11, 12. 
13. Ibid., n. 8 (in case of incestuous marriages). 
14. Ibid., n. 8, 13. 
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tion, but they did not do so uniformly nor in accordance with fixed 
principles.1G D'Argentre regarded these matters as belonging to the 
personal statute which he admitted, by way of exception to his 
general doctrine, to have extra-territorial effect ex proprio vigore. 
In order to restrict the scope of this exception he held, however, that 
a statute was personal only if ( 1) it affected "the person in a gen-
eral and not merely in some special manner, and (2) it did not affect 
immovable property directly or indirectly.16 According to Paul 
Voet laws relating to status or capacity were not operative ipso 
jure in another stateP He recognizes that on grounds of comity 
extra-territorial effect might be given to the personal statute, but he 
mentions only the case of a prodigal placed under guardianship, and 
holds that the incapacity thereby imposed would be recognized even 
with respect to immovable property in another state.18 John Voet 
set forth the theory of the Dutch school more fully than any other 
writer, and forcefully argued in favor of the proposition that the 
laws governing status and capacity, like any other laws, could have 
by reason of their own inherent force no extra-territorial opera-
tion.19 To what extent exceptio~s might ibe recognized on grounds 
of comity is discussed by him in connection with the different topics. 
He felt unable to lay down any general rules in this regard.20 
Huber is generally very lucid in his statements, but in the mat-
ter of status and capacity it is difficult to get his exact meaning. He 
says that from the general maxims stated the following maxim 
may also be derived :21 
"Personal qualities impressed upon a person by the law of a par-
ticular place surround and accompany: him everywhere with this effect, 
that everywhere persons enjoy and are subject to the law whieh persons 
of the same class enjoy and are subject to in that other place." 
The illustrations given in the same section would seem to indi-
cate that a person who has become of age according to the lex 
domicilii will have capacity everywhere to bind himself and even 
to transfer immovable property situated elsewhere, and that a per-
son placed under guardianship by the law of his domicile will not 
be bound by contracts entered into in another state. From the two 
15. Laine, "Introduction au droit international prive," I, 259-62; 
Catellani, "Il diritto internazionale privato," I, 332-340. 
16. D'Argentre, "Commentarii in patrias britonum leges," art. 218, 
glosse 6, n. 7, 8. 
17. P. V oet, "De statutis," s. 4, c. 2, n. 6, 7. 
18. P. Voet, "De statutis," s. 4, c. 3, n. 17. 
19. J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," bk. 1, tit. 4, pt. 2, n. 5 et seq. 
20. J. Voet, Ibid., n. 16. 
21. Hnber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 12. 
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sections that follow it is clear, however, that such is not Huber's 
meaning. He there distinguishes between status and capacity and 
subjects the latter to the lex loci actus.22 
Capacity to Dispose of Immovable Property. The writers be-
longing to the Italian school applied the lex domicilii.23 Those fol-
lowing d'Argentre disagreed with respect to the question whether a 
statute affecting capacity to dispose of immovable property should 
be regarded as a real statute. D' Argentre himself was of this 
opinion ;24 but some of the later writers, giving a more restricted 
meaning to the term "real statute," held that the laws governing 
capacity to convey immovable property inter vivos, or by will, be-
longed to the class of personal statutes and were subject, therefore, 
to the lex domicilii. 25 Others made various distinctions. 26 All 
would admit that if the law of the situs prohibited a transfer of the 
property such prohibition was binding everywhere. 
Of the writers belonging to the Dutch school Paul27 and J ohn28 
Voet held that the law of the situs would determine the capacity of 
a person to dispose of immovable property. Huber does not ex-
press himself clearly on the point. He states that the lex loci actus 
"does not apply to immovables when they are considered, not as to 
their dependency upon the free disposition of the respective owners, 
but as to the extent in which certain qualities are found impressed 
upon them by the law of the particular country in which they are 
situated; such qualities remain unaffected in such state irrespective 
of what the laws of other states or the agreements of individuals 
22. Laine assumes that Huber in giving the illustrations mentioned in 
paragraph 12 must have had in mind some conditions which he does not 
express. Such conditions may have been, according to Laine, that the judges 
called upon to apply the foreign law had authority to confirm the "venia 
aetatis" or the interdiction, or to declare the party of age in accordance with 
local law: Laine, "Introduction au droit international prive," II, 185. 
23. Catellani, "II diritto internazionale privato," I, 485-86. 
24. D'Argentre, "Commentarii in patrias britonum leges," art. 218, 
glosse 6, n. 7, 8. 
25. H ert, "Opera," I, "de collisione legum," s. 4, n. 8. 
26. Rodenburg and Boullenois accepted the doctrine that the lex domi-
cilii governed with respect to transfers inter vivos. (Rodenburg, "Trac-
tatus de jure conjugum," tit 2, c. 1; Boullenois, "Traite de Ia person-
nalite et de la realite des Ioix," ed. 1766, I; 77 et seq.; 127 et seq.; 705 
et seq.; "Dissertations sur des questions qui naissent de la contrariete des 
loix et des coutumes," ed. 1732, 2-4.) As regards wills Rodenburg applied 
the lex rei sitae ("Tractatus, de jure conjugum," tit. 2, c. 5, n. 7). Boullenois 
distinguished whether the capacity to make a will affected the person or 
immovables. In the former case the lex domicilii would govern; in the 
latter case, the law of the situs (Bottllenois, "Traite de Ia personnalite," I, 
718, ed. 1766). 
27. P. Voet, "De statutis," s. 9, c. 1, n. 4; s. 4, c. 2, n. 6; s. 4, c. 3, n. 12. 
28. J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," bk. 1, tit. 4, pt. 2, n. 8. 
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may provide to the contrary."29 From his subsequent observations 
it is doubtful whether in Huber's opinion the majority of a party 
to convey immovable property, or his general capacity to dispose of 
such property, should be governed by the lex rei sitae, or whether on 
grounds of comity the lex loci actus or the lex domicilii should con-
trol. The. statement quoted may refer only to special mandatory 
provisions of the law of the situs.80 
Capacity to Make a Will Disposing of Movable Property. The 
capacity of a testator to dispose of movable property by will has 
been determined invariably by the lex domicilii of the testator at the 
time of his death.31 Huber does not express himself on the sub-
ject. 
Form. Under the influence of Bartolus, the jurists of the 
Italian school came, on grounds of practical convenience, to recog-
nize the rule that a legal act executed in the form prescribed by the 
law of the place of execution should ·be regarded as valid every-
where. At first this rule was an optional one, it being permissible to 
comply as regards formal execution with the law governing the 
validity of the transaction in general. Whether in the opinion of 
these writers the rule locus regit actum, as it was subsequently 
called, assumed in the course of time a mandatory character is un-
certain.32 D'Argentre's doctrine of the territorial character of all 
law should have caused him logically to apply the lex rei sitae to 
the transfer of immovable property. But he passed the question 
over in silence, and his successors retained the traditional rule and 
applied it .especially with respect to wills.33 The rule locus regit 
actum was at first optional in France, but it became obligatory in 
the end~~ An express prohibition of the law of the situs would, of 
course, prevail.86 The Belgian jurists were the first to accept the 
29. Huber, "Praelect," pt 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 15. 
30. The view that the lex rei sitae should determine the capacity to 
transfer immovable property inter vivos and by will became also the prevail-
ing view in Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Wachter, 
"Archiv fiir die civilistische Praxis," XXIV, 275. 
31. J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," bk. 28, tit. 3, n. 12. 
32. Laine, "Introduction au droit international prive," II, 399-400. 
33. Laine, "Introduction au droit international prive," II, 359; Bot~hier, 
"Observations sur la coutume du duche de Bourgogne": "Oeuvres," I, 766, 
c. 28, n. 10, ed. 1787; Fro land, "Memoire concernans la nature et la qualite 
des statuts," I, 136, ed. 1729. 
According to Boullenois, if the formalities prescribed relate to proof 
and authenticity the lex loci actus applies, but if they are attached to things 
the law of the situs governs: Boullenois, I, obs. 21, p. 426; obs. 23, p. 456; 
Bot~llmois, II, obs. 46, rule 4, p. 467, ed. 1766. 
34. Laine, "Introduction au droit inter-national prive," II, 400-405. 
35. Bouhier, "Observations sur la coutume du duche de Bourgogne," 
c. 28, n. 10; "Oeuvres," I, 766, ed. 1787. 
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logical conclusion to which d'Argentre's doctrine led, and under their 
influence the Edict of Albert and Isabella, of 1611, was enacted, 
Art. 13 of which prescribed that the formalities of wills relating to 
land should be governed by the law of the situs.36 The inconven-
ience of this rule began, however, to be felt very soon. Juristic 
opinion reverted in favor of the lex loci actus and found expres-
sion in an official interpretation, as it was called, of the Edict by the 
Privy Council of the Belgian Provinces, rendered in 1634, which 
amounted in fact to a repeal of the above provision. It held that a 
will relating to foreign immovables might be validly executed in 
Belgium in the form prescribed by Belgian law.37 
The writers of the Dutch school entertained different views 
on the subject. Paul Voet recognized the rule locus regit actum, 
even as regards transactions affecting immovable property. A will 
disposing of such property was void, according to him, if it did not 
satisfy, as regards form, the lex loci actus.38 He allowed, however, 
certain exceptions to the mandatory character of the rule, the prin-
cipal one of which was that a contract or a will which was not 
executed in the form prescribed by the law of the place of execution 
should be sustained at the domicile of such party if it complied with 
the formal requirements of the lex domicilii.39 Huber applied his 
second maxim, that all parties are to be deemed subjects of the 
place where they happen to be, to matters of form and concluded 
therefrom that the lex loci actus was binding absolutely. He recog-
nized no exception and held the rule applicable to movable and 
immovable property alike. ~0 According to him a will by a Dutch 
36. Art. 13 of the Edict reads as follows: "Si es lieux de residence des 
Testateurs, et de Ia situation de leurs Biens, y a diversite de Coutumes pour 
le regard de ces dispositions de derniere volonte; Nous ordonnons qu'en tant 
que touche Ia qualite desdits Biens, si on en peut disposer, en quel age, et 
avec queUe forme et solennite, on suivra les Coutumes et usances de Ia dite 
situation." Nouveau commentaire sur l'Edit Perpetuel, du 12 juillet, 1611 
(Lille, 1770), p. 79. 
Burgundus and Christinaeus approved this view: Burgtmdus, "Tractatus 
controversiarum ad consuetudines Flandriae," tract. 6, n. 2, 3; Christinaetls, 
"Practicarum quaestionum decisiones," IV, dec. 5, n. 5. 
37. Laitze, "Introduction au droit international prive," II, 362. 
38. P. Voet, "De statutis," s. 9, c. 2, n. 1, 3. 
39. Ibid., n. 9, exc. 4. A will executed in the forms prescribed by the 
lex loci actus would not be sustained at the domicile, however, if the testator 
had gone to such place for the purpose of evading the lex domicilii. Ibid., 
n. 4. 
40. Huber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 3, 4, 8. 
"Si lex actui formam dat, inspiciendus est locus actus, non domicilii, 
non rei sitae. . . . licet enim hie subjectus revera maneat patriae suae, 
tamen illud, ut supra diximus, de actu primo est intelligendum, quoad actum 
vero secundum subditus illius loci sit temporarius, ubi agit vel contrahit, 
simulque ut forum ibi sortitur, ita statu tis ligatur": H ert, "Opera," I, "de 
collisione legum,'' s. 4, n. 10, p. 179, ed. 1716. 
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subject disposing of property in Holland, executed in Frisia in the 
form prescribed by the Dutch law, was therefor~ invalid.n John 
Voet, on the other hand, would sustain a will disposing of movable 
property if it conformed, as regards formal execution, either to the 
lex loci actus or to the lex domicilii and a will disposing of im-
movable property if it satisfied the lex loci actus or the lex rei sitae. ~2 
Immovable Property. The question to what extent the capacity 
of a person to convey immovable property and the formal require~ 
ments of instruments disposing of such property are controlled by 
the law of the situs has been discussed already. As regards sub-
stantive validity it should be noted that, ever sinee d' Argentre, laws 
affecting immovables as such formed the principal class of real 
statutes and were governed by the lex rei sitae.43 Great differences 
of opinion existed, however, in the application of the rule.H All 
agreed that an express prohibition imposed •by the law of the situs 
should be respected everywhere.45 Huber applies to immovables 
the law of the situs "when they are considered, not as to their 
dependency upon the free disposition of the respective owners, but 
as to the extent in which certain qualities are found impressed upon 
them by the law of the particular country in which they .are 
situated."46 
Movable Property. From the earliest time in the Conflict of 
Laws movables were deemed subject to the law of the domicile of 
their owner, a rule which was expressed by the Latin maxims 
"mobilia ossibus inhaerent" and "~obilia personam sequuntur." 
These maxims were employed as a rule with reference to questions 
of succession and to the property of married persons, that is, with 
reference to questions affecting a person's property as a whole. 
Scarcely an instance can be found where the rule was actually 
41. Huber, Ibii:l., n. 4. 
42. J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," bk. 1, tit. 4, pt. 2, n. 15. 
The rule that a legal act was valid, as regards formal requirements, if 
it satisfied the law of the place of execution, was established also in Ger-
many in the course of the sixteenth century: Wachter, Archiv fiir die 
civilistische Praxis, XXIV, 276. 
43. There is little on the subject in the works of the writers belonging 
to the Italian school (Laine, "Introduction au droit international prive," I, 
258-59; Catellani, "II diritto internazionale privato," I, 346-49). Bartolus 
inquires by what law the question whether a person has the right to raise 
a house higher is to be governed and he answers it by referring the question 
to the law of the situs: Bartolus, "In primam codicis partem commentaria," 
English translation by Professor Beale under the title of "Bartolus on the 
Conflict of Laws," n. 27. 
44. Laine, "Introduction au droit international prive," I, 328 et seq., 342 
et seq., 395 et seq., 408 et seq., 413 et seq. 
45. Rodenburg, "Tractatus de jure conjugum," tit 2, c. 5, n. 1-6. 
46. Httber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 15. 
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applied to the transfer of a particular article. The older writers 
stated the rule governing movables in general terms without dis-
tinguishing between the cases where a person's property as a whole 
was affected or the transfer related to a particular article.47 Some 
followed d'Argentre's48 view and held that movable property was 
attached to the person of the owner, being adherent to his person, 
as it were, and was governed, therefore, by the law governing his 
person. Others agreed with Dumoulin/9 and regarded .the question 
as falling within the real statute and subject, therefore, to th~ law 
of the situs, but by a legal fic_tion regarded such property to be at 
the domicile of the owner. Of the writers of the Dutch school 
Paul 5° and J ohn51 V oet accepted Dumoulin's view. Huber recog-
nized .the general rule in the distribution of movable property upon 
death but dismisses the subject by a mere reference to John a 
Sande.52 The latter accepted d'Argentre's explanation.53 
Contracts. The writers of the Italian school applied the law 
of the place where the contract was made to the determination of 
the natural consequences of a contract, that is, to the consequences 
which inhere in the contract from its inception, and the law of the 
place of performance, to the consequences which arise subsequently 
to the formation of the contract as the result of negligence or de-
fault. If no place of performance was specified the negligence or 
default was deemed to occur at the forum. 54 Dumoulin did not 
distinguish between the direct and indirect consequences of a con-
tract but advanced the view that the intention of the parties should 
govern. If such intention was not expressed it was to be derived 
from the attendant circumstances. 55 
47. Bar, "Private International Law" (Guthrie's translation), 488-90. 
48. D'Argmtre, "Commentarii in patrias britonum leges," art. 218, 
glosse 6, n. 30. 
49. Dumoulin, "Coutumes generales du haut et bas pays d'Auvergne," 
II, art. 41; "Opera," II, 747, col. 1, ed. 1681; 
50. P. Voet, "De statutis," s. 4, c. 2, n. 2, 8; s. 9, c. 1, n. 8. 
51. J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," bk. 1, tit. 4, pt. 2, n. 11. 
52. Huber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 15. 
53. John a Sande, "Opera juridica omnia," "Dec. Fris.," bk. 4, tit. 8, 
de£. 7, p. 194, ed. 1697. 
54. Laine, "Introduction au droit. international prive," I, 135-36; Bartoltts 
(Beale's translation), n. 15, 16, 18. Bartolus applies the same rules to a 
contract to sell immovable property : ibid., n. 16. 
55. Laine, "Introduction au droit inter-national prive," I, 255-56. 
"Aut statutum loquitur de his, quae meritum scilicet causae vel deci-
sionem concernunt, et tunc aut in his, quae pendent a voluntate partium, vel 
per eas immutari possunt et tunc inspiciuntur circumstantiae, voluntatis, 
quarum una est Statutum loci, in quo contrahitur; et domicilii contrahentium 
antiqui vel recentis, et similes circumstantiae" : Dumoulin, "In codicem 
Justiniani," I, 1, "conclusiones de statutis aut consuetudinibus localibus ;" 
"Opera," III, 554, ed. 1681. 
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The principle that the will of the parties, expressed or implied, 
was the controlling consideration was accepted also by the Dutch 
writers. In conformity with this view a contract might have extra-
territorial operation and affect immovable property in another state. 56 
Mandatory provisions of the situs would, of course, prevail.57 Nor 
could effect be given to the expressed or implied intention of the 
parties if it ran counter to prohibitory statutes of the forum or its 
laws establishing a public policy.58 Huber appears to accept these 
views. He holds, however, relying on the Roman maxim "con-
traxisse unusquisque in eo loco intellegitur, in quo ut solveret, se 
o'bligavit" that where the place of performance differs from the law 
of the place w~ere the contract was entered into, the parties will 
be deemed to have contracted with reference to the law of the place 
of performance. 59 
Marriage. According to the early writers capacity to marry 
was governed by the general rule applicable to capacity. On grounds 
of policy and because of the influence of the church, whose co-opera-
tion was necessary in the celebration of a marriage, it seems, how-
ever, that the lex loci celebrationis had a greater influence than in 
connection with ordinary contracts.60 
As regards the ceremony required to constitute a valid mar-
riage the rule locus regit actum was recognized.61 Whether a mar-
riage could validly be entered into by observing the formalities pre-
scribed by the law of the domicile of the parties is not certain. The 
question cannot have arisen frequently in practice as even in 
Protestant countries it was the universal custom to celebrate a 
religious marriage, which in the nature of things conformed to the 
lex loci celebrationis.62 The jurists who explained the rule locus 
regit actum on the theory of a Yoluntary submission to the local law 
56. P. Voet, "De statutis," s. 4, c. 2, n. 15. Cf. s. 9, c. 1, n. 2; J. Voet, 
"Ad pandectas,'' bk. 1, tit. 4, pt. 2, n. 19. 
57. J. V oet, "Ad pandectas," bk. 1, tit. 4, pt. 2, n. 20. 
58. Ibid., n. 18. For illustrations see also Huber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, 
bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 11. 
59. Huber, "Praelect," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 10. 
60. Catellani, "It diritto internazionale privato," I, 478-79. 
Boullenois expresses himself concerning the old French law as follows: 
" . . le mariage etant du droit civil de chaque nation, par rapport aux 
formalites et aux conditions que la loi de chaque Pays exige, it est bon et 
valable dans tout autre, des qu'il a ete une fois valablement contracte dans 
un Pays": Boullenois, "Traite de la personnalite et de la realite des loix,'' 
I, c. 3, obs. 23, p. 495, ed. 1766. 
61. P. Voet, "De statutis," s. 9, c. 2, n. 9; J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," bk. 
23, tit. 2, n. 4. 
62. Friedberg, "Das Recht der Eheschliessung in seiner geschichtlichen 
Entwickeluilg," 295-96. See also Vamier, "Droit fran~is du mariage au 
point de vue du droit international prive," Paris, 1891, pp. 84 et seq. 
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naturally assumed that the rule had a mandatory character.63 This 
was also no doubt Huber's view.64 
Various exceptions were laid down with reference to the ap-
plication of the lex loci celebrationis. A marriage celebrated in 
accordance with the law of the place of celebration might not be 
recognized at the domicile of the parties if it was entered into in 
the face of a prohibitory statute there existing,65 or in evasion of the 
law of the domicile,66 or if it was deemed to conflict in other respects 
with the law of the forum. According to Huber such marriage will 
not be recognized if it prejudices others, if it is incestuous or if it 
was entered into in evasion of the law of the domicile.67 
Effect of Marriage Upon Property. In the absence of a mar-
riage settlement the writers of the Italian school applied the per-
sonal law of the husband.68 D'Argentre regarded the statutes re-
lating to the effect of marriage upon the property of the spouses as 
real statutes, and held in consequence that the law of the domicile 
could not affect property situated in another province or country.89 
Dumoulin, on the contrary, maintained that the parties must be 
deemed to have submitted, by way of tacit agreement, to the lex 
domicilii.70 Most of the later wl'iters on the Conflict of Laws have 
accepted Dumoulin's theory of a tacit contract and the law of matri-
monial domicile as the governing law.71 Some writers, notably 
Boullenois, rejected the notion of a tacit contract, but desired that 
a single law should govern the property rights of spouses. They 
contended that the laws relating to the effect of marriage upon 
the property rights of husband and wife belonged to the status of 
63. H ert, ''Opera," I: "de collisione legum," s. 4, n. 10. 
64. Huber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 8. 
65. J. V oet, "Ad pandectas,'' bk. 23, tit. 2, n. 4. 
66. Ibid., bk. 1, tit. 4, pt. 2, .n. 14; Boullmois, "Traite de Ia personnalite 
et de Ia realite des loix,'' I, obs. 31, p. 427, ed. 1766; Bouhier, "Observations 
sur Ia coutume du duche de Bourgogne," I, c. 28, n. 60-62, "Oeuvres," I, 
773-74, ed. 1787. 
67. Httber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 8. 
68. Barto/us on the ''Conflict of Laws" (Beale's translation), n. 19. 
69. D'Argentre, "Commentarii in patrias britonum leges," art. 218, glosse 
6, n. 28-33. 
70. Dttmoulin, "Consilium," 53, n. 3, "Opera," II, 964, ed. 1681. 
71. Botthier, "Observations sur la coutume du duche de Bourgogne,'' I, 
c. 26, n. 3, "Oeuvres," I, 714, ed. 1787; 1 H ert, "Opera": "de collisione legum," 
s. 4, n. 44, 46, 47, 49. Pothier, "Traite de Ia communaute, principes prelimi-
naires," n. 15. The latter states expressly that if the husband at the time of 
the marriage had the intention to acquire a new domicile he will be deemed 
to have submitted to the law of the new domicile. 
The above became also the prevailing view in Germany towards the end 
of the seventeenth century. Wachter, Archiv fiir die civilistische Praxis, 
XXV, 48. Concerning the writers following d'Argentre's view, see Hert, 
"Opera,'' I, "de collisione legum,'' s. 4, n. 46. 
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marriage and were governed, therefore, by the personal law of the 
parties, that is, the law of their domicile.72 Writers rejecting the 
contract theory and basing the application of the lex domicilii upon 
the direct operation of the law governing the status of the parties 
were logically forced to hold upon a change of domicile, that the 
law of the new domicile must determine the rights of the parties 
in future acquisitions of property, but it seems that this conclusion 
was not uniformly reached.73 All. agreed that express prohibitions 
or ot~er mandatory provisions of the law of the situs were binding 
everywhere.7' 
The Dutch writers entertained conflicting views. Paul Voet 
states that the matter is governed by the law of maJtrimonial domi-
cile, by which is meant the law of the actual domicile of the husband 
at the time of marriage, or, if he intended at that time to esta:blish 
a new domicile, ·the law of the intended domicile.75 He says also 
that a subsequent change in the domicile will not affect the ap-
plicatory law.76 At the same time he holds that the laws concerning 
the effect of marriage upon the property of the spouses are real and 
have no operation with respect to foreign property.77 Story's ex-
72. "Je ne sais si, pour echapper a tousles cris de M. d'Argentre contre 
Me. Charles du Molin, i1 n'eiit pas ete plus court et plus convenable, sans 
recourir a la presomption d'une convention et d'une soumission, dont il ne 
paroit aucune trace, de regarder les statuts de la communaute et de la non-
communaute, comme des Loix qui affectent l~s conjoints d'un etat et d'une 
condition pure personnelle": Bo11llenois, "Traite de la personnalite et de la 
realite des loix," II, obs. 28, pp. 299-300, ed. 1766. 
73. See Bo11llenois, "Traite de la personnalite et de la realite des loix," 
II, obs. 38. 
74. Bo11hier, "Observations sur la coutume du duche de Bourgogne," 
I, c. 26, n. 3, 21, "Oeuvres," I, 714, 716, ed. 1787. 
75. P. Voet, "De statutis," s. 9, c. 2, n. 5. 
76. Ibid., s. 9, c. 2, n. 7, where he says: "Quid si maritus alio domicilium 
postmodum transtulerit, eritne conveniendus, secundum loci statutum, in 
quem postremum sese recepit? Non equidem. Quia non eo ipso, quod 
domicilium transferat, censetur voluntatem circa pacta nuptialia mutasse .... 
Nisi eadem solemnitas in actu contrario intercesserit. . . . Accedit, quod 
illa pacta sol us mutare nequeat maritus : id quod tamen posset, si per emigra-
tionem in alium locum, ea mutarentur." 
77. He says: "Verum quid statuendum de variarum Provinciarum in 
Belgio consuetudine, vel potius statuto, quo inter conjuges post celebratas 
nuptias, ut in Hollandia; post copulam, ut apud Ultrajectinos, bonorum 
inducitur communio, nisi pactis sit exclusa dotalibus, 'reali ne statuto ad-
numerabitur, an potius personali? Resp. Et si forte de jure civili tale sta-
tutum, ad exemplum societatis ad bona alibi jacentia sese extenderet, in 
qua societate, si ea sit omnium bonorum, etiam omnia continuo, perfectam 
aliquam traditionem, exceptis nominibus, communicabantur. . . . 
"Etiam si pactum interveniat, ex eo nasceretur actio personalis, ad bono-
rum extra territorium jacentium, ubi contraria consuetudo locum habet com-
municationem, vel aestimationem. . . . Quia tamen illa communio sta-
tutaria potissimum rerum spectat alienationem, adeoque res ipsas afficit pri-
mario et principaliter, negari non poterit, quin reali statuto, hoc nostrum sit 
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planation of the various passages is that according to Voet all such 
contracts, whether express or tacit, are real and not personal laws, 
and therefore do not directly affect property out of the territory, 
"but only indirectly, by a remedy to enforce the contract against 
extra-territorial property.''7S 
John Voet, strong advocate as he was of the doctrine that all 
laws are territorial, and holding in that respect widely different 
views from Dumoulin, on grounds of expediency accepted the lat-
ter's theory of a tacit contract. Indeed, he contributed much in 
establishing the doctrine by showing in a most ingenious and force-
ful manner that the effect of marriage upon the property rights of 
the spouses results from the will of the parties.79 
Huber rejected the theory of tacit contract, for he states ex-
pressly that upon a change of domicile the former law will not con-
trol the rights of the parties in property that is subsequently ac-
quired. 80 In other respects he accepts the view that the rights of 
the parties with reference to all property, immovable as well as 
movable, should be controlled by one law, the law of matrimonial 
domicile. 51 
Marriage Settlements. The validity of marriage settlements, so 
far as it depends upon capacity or form, is governed by the rules 
stated above. With respect to substantive validity the law of matri-
monial domicile has been held generally to govern, subject to man-
datory provisions of the law of the situs of immovables.82 
Int£state S·ttccession. The writers of the Italian school did not 
work out any consistent theory on this subject. Influenced by the 
4octrine of universal succession of the Roman law some applied the 
law of the domicile of the decedent to all property. Many held, 
connumerandum; ut ad bona alibi sita, ubi contrarium obtinet statutum, 
reales effectus non exerat . . .": P. Voet, "Ad statutis," s. 4, c. 3, n. 9. 
78. Story, "Conflict of Laws," 8th ed., 254, note 4. 
79. J. V oet, "Ad pandectas,'' bk. 23, tit. 2, n. 85. 
80. H1eber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 9. 
81. Ibid., n. 10. 
82. Huber, "Praelect., pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 10; Catellani, "Il diritto inter-
nazionale privato," I, 356, 481. 
Bartolus had already contended that marriage settlements should be 
governed by the law of the husband's domicile. After stating that the lex 
loci contractus governs matters which arise out of the contract itself at the 
time it is made, he adds : (n. 17) "This doctrine does not apply in the case 
of dowry, for a reason stated in the text'' (Bartolus on the "Conflict of 
Laws," Beale's translation, p. 19). The passage referred to is Digest, V, 
1, 65, which reads as follows: "Exigere dotem mulier debet illic, ubi maritus 
domicilium habuit, non ubi instrumentum dotale conscriptum est; nee enim 
id genus contractus est, ut et eum locum spectari oporteat, in quo instru-
mentum dotis factum est, quam eum, in cujus domicilium et ipsa mulier per 
condicionem· matrimonii erat reditura." 
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however, that the laws governing intestate succession were real. 
According to Bartolus a distinction must be made. If the statute of 
the situs of immovable property is real it would govern absolutely. 
If it was personal, it would not apply to the estate of a foreigner.83 
All were agreed that the law of the domicile .of the decedent would 
determine the distribution of movables. In France and Germany 
laws of succession were regarded from the beginning as real.84 
D' Argentre proclaimed vigorously the same doctrine. As regards 
immovables the law of the situs therefore applied.85 Movables, 
however, were considered as adhering to the person or as being 
situated at his domicile and were controlled, consequently, by the 
law of the decedent's domicile.86 The above became the general 
doctrine in the seventeenth century in France, Belgium, Holland, 
and Germany.87 The Dutch jurists Paul88 and John89 Voet and 
Huber90 accepted this view. The doctrine that the succession to the 
whole estate of the decedent should ibe governed by one law arose 
only at a later date.91 
Wills. The rules governing capacity and form have been 
stated above. The substantive validity of wills relating to mov-
ables was governed by the domicile of the testator at the time of 
death.92 Wills relating to immovables were subject to the law of 
the situs.93 These views were shared also by the Dutch writers, 
including Huber.94 The latter does not mention the rule governing 
83. Bartolus on the "Conflict of Laws" (Beale's translation), n. 42; 
Laine, "Introduction au droit international prive," II, 289-290. 
84. Laine, "Introduction au droit international prive," II, 284. 
85. D'Argentre, "Commentarii in patrias britonum leges," art. 218, 
glosse 6, n. 9, 10, 23, 24. 
86. "Sed alia ratio est de personarum jure in quo et moblia continentur, 
quia talia non alio jure habentur quam persona ipsa, et ideo legem ab domi-
cilii loco capiunt": D'Argentre, "Commentarii in patrias britonum leges," 
art. 218, glosse 6, n. 3. 
87. Laine, "Introduction au droit international prive," II, 294 et seq. 
88. P. Voet, "De statutis," s. 4, c. 3, .n. 10; s. 9, c. 1, n. 3, 8. 
89. J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," bk 1, tit. 4, pt. 2, n. 3, 11, 21; bk. 38, tit. 
18, n. 34 (movables). 
90. H11ber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 15. 
91. In Germany theory and practice broke away from the old law in the 
eighteenth century. The new doctrine supported the application of the law 
of the domicile of the decedent at the time of his death to immovable and 
movable property alike. The principal •grounds upon which this doctrine 
was justified were: 1, that the estate represents the person of the deceased 
and should be governed therefore by his personal law; 2, that the law of in-
heritance is a succession in universum jus, which must be subject to one law: 
See Wachter, Archiv fiir die civilistische Praxis, XXV, 195-98. 
92. D'Argentre, "Commentarii in patrias britonum leges," art. 218, 
glosse 6, n. 30; J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," bk. 28, tit. 3, n. 12. 
93. Dumoulin, "In codicem Justiniani," I, 1, "conclusiones de statutis 
aut consuetudinibus localibus," "Opera," III, 556, ed. 1681. 
94. P. V oet, "De statutis," s. 9, c. 1, n. 4, 8; J. V oet, "Ad pandectas," 
bk. 28, tit. 1, n. 44; H11ber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 15. 
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the interpretation of wills. In this regard the writers1 generally 
referred to the domicile of the testator at the time of the execution 
of the will, even with respect to wills disposing of iinmovables.95 
Procedure. Since Bartolus, it has been recognized that mat-
ters relating to procedure were subject to the law of the forum.96 
Great differences of opinion have existed, however, with respect 
to the matters falling within the term "procedure." This has been 
true especially concerning the statute of limitations or prescription 
of actions. Bartolus regarded the question as going to the sub-
stance. In the matter of contracts he applied the law of the place 
of performance. 97 The later writers followed Bartol us in regard-
ing the question of the prescription of actions as affecting the sub-
stantive rights of the parties instead of the remedy merely. In its 
application to contracts some applied the law of the place of con-
tracting; others, the law of the place of performance.98 Paul Voet 
broke with the traditional view on the subject by holding that the 
prescription of actions is a matter of remedy and subject to the 
law of the forum.99 Huber took the same view.100 Neither of these 
authors advanced any reasons for rejecting the old view. John 
Voet, who accepted the same doctrine, appears to justify it on the 
ground that the forum will be generally the domicile of the debtor.101 
The prescription of actions affecting immovables was held by all 
to be subject to the lex rei sitae.102 
lnt.ernational Jurisdiction in Civil Matters. Following in the 
footsteps of the Roman law, the continental countries have never 
taken the view adopted by the Anglo-American courts that a per-
sonal action may 'be brought in any country in which the defendant 
may be served with process. They have required always that the 
defendant shall either be domiciled in the place where the action 
is brought, or own property there, or that the transaction shall have 
some connection with the law of that place.103 Where the jurisdic-
95. J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," bk. 28, tit. 5, n. 16; H ert, "Opera," I: "de 
collisione legum," s. 6, n. 3, p. 222, ed. 1716. 
96. Bartoltts on the "Conflict of Laws" (Beale's translation), n. 15. 
97. Ibid., n. 19. 
98. llfichel, "La prescription liberatoire en droit international prive," 
29 et seq. 
99. P. Voet, "De statutis," s. 10, n. 1. 
100. Httber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 7. 
101. J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," bk. 44, tit. 3, n. 12. 
102. Dumoulin, "Opera," III, 557, ed. 1681; J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," 
bk. 44, tit. 3, n. 12; Boullenois, "Traite de la personnalite et de la realite des 
loix," I, obs. 20, p. 350, ed. 1766. 
103. W etzell, "System des ordentlichen Civilprozesses," 3d ed., §§ 40-41; 
Bar, "Private International Law" (Guthrie's translation), 908 et seq. 
The French doctrine that the courts have, on principle, no jurisdiction in 
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tion was based upon the forum contractus the Roman law required 
in addition that the defendant ·be served with process within the 
jurisdiction or that he possess property in such jurisdiction.10"' In 
modem times it has been contended, however, that inasmuch as the 
requirement of personal service in the above case resulted in Roman 
law from the fact that it knew nothing of citation by writing, this 
condition should be recognized no longer today when a citation by 
writing may be served upon the defendant in another state.105 Even 
the writers belonging to the Dutch school, who e~ended the doc-
trine of the territoriality of all laws beyond the earlier writers, did 
not go so far as the Anglo-American courts, so as to base jurisdic-
tion in personal actions upon service alone. In consonance with the 
principles of the Roman law,t06 which he followed, Huber held that 
all actions might be brought' at the domicile of the defendant.107 
Actions in rem might be brought, according to Huber, also at the 
situs of the property, 108 and actions arising out of contracts, at the 
place where such contracts were to be fulfilled/09 or, in exceptional 
cases, where they had been entered intoP0 
Foreign Judgments. The subject of res judicata and the 
enforcement of foreign judgments has become greatly complicated 
personal actions with respect to suits between foreigners is of modern origin. 
It did not exist in the old law: 8 Denisart, "Collection de decisions nouvelles, 
Etranger, § V, n. 1; 5 Weiss, "Traite de droit international prive," Zd ed., 55. 
Concerning the old French law see in general, Boulleuois, "Traite de Ia 
personnalite et de Ia realite des loix," obs. 25. 
104. W etzell, "System des ordentlichen Civilprozesses,'' 3d ed., § 41, 
p. 509, citing Digest, V, 1, 19, § 1, pr.; XIII, 4, 1 ; Bar, "Private International 
Law" (Guthrie's translation), 921. 
105. W etzell, "System des ordentlichen Civilprozesses," 3d ed., § 41, 
p, 509. 
106. "Juris ordinem converti postulas ut non actor rei forum, sed reus 
actoris sequatur; nam ubi domicilium res habet vel tempore contractus habuit, 
licet hoc postea transtulerit, ibi tan tum eum conveniri oportet": Code, III, 
13, 2. 
"Actor rei forum, sive in rem sive in personam sit actio, sequitur. Sed 
et in locis, in quibus res, propter quas contenditur, constitutae sunt, iubemus 
in rem actionem adversus possidentem moveri": Code, III, 19, 3. 
"Venire bona ibi oportet, ubi quisque defendi debet, id est, ubi domi-
cilium habet, aut ubi quisque contraxerit. Contractum autem non utique eo 
loco intellegitur, quo negotium gestum sit, sed quo solvenda est pecunia": 
Digest, XXXXII, 5, 1-3. Cf. Digest, V, 1, 19, and discussion of subject by 
Bar, "Private International Law" (Guthrie's translation), 917-19, note 64, 
107. Huber, "Praelect.," pt. 2, bk. 5, tit. 1, n. 49. 
108. Ibid., n. 48. Huber applied this doctrine both to movables and im-
movables. John Voet, on the other hand, held that as regards actions in 
rem affecting immovables the jurisdiction of the situs was exclusive: J. Voet, 
"Ad pandectas," bk. 5, tit. 1, n. 77. 
109. Huber, "Praelect," pt. 2, bk. 5, tit. 1, n. 53, 54. 
110. Ibid., n. 55. In accordance with the provisions of the Roman law 
Huber required with respect to contracts the additional condition that the 
defendant be served within the jurisdiction or own property therein: n. 54. 
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in modem times in consequence of the development of territorial 
sovereignty. During the Middle Ages, when the Roman law was 
regarded on the continent as the jus commune of all civilized coun-
tries, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments rendered 
by courts of competent jurisdiction appeared a natural duty im-
posed by considerations of justice. The jurists applied to this sub-
ject the same rules which were deemed controlling in the determina-
tion of the question whether a law . had only territorial or also 
~tra-territorial operation. Foreign judgments in personam were 
generally given effect everywhere in accordance with the Ro-
man maxim "res judicata pro veritate accipitur."111 Baldus,112 
D'Argentre,113 John Voet/14 and Hertius115 held this view, which 
Hu:berl16 likewise followed. According to the Dutch writers such 
recognition and enforcement rested, however, upon comity and 
would be declined when the interests of the forum or of its sub-
jects would be impaired thereby.117 The courts of the situs were 
regarded as having exclusive jurisdiction with respect to actions in 
rem affecting immovables.l18 Such judgments were not recognized 
or enforced, therefore, unless rendered by a court of the situs.119 
Some of the French writers took views differing from the 
above.120 
Criminal LO!W. The doctr.ine that criminal laws are exclusively 
territorial is a modern doctrine and was not established as yet when 
Huber wrote. Bartolus and Baldus had developed a considerable 
number of rules concerning the law of crimes in its international 
aspects. One of these was that if a citizen was prosecuted for a 
crime which he had committed abroad his guilt and punishment 
should be determined in accordance with the lex loci delicti.121 The 
leading French writers on the subject of the Conflict of Laws dur-
ing the sixteenth century, D' Argentre and Dumoulin, paid little 
111. Digest, I, 5, 25. 
112. Baldus, "In primum, secundum et tertium codicis librum com-
mentaria,'' bk. 1, tit "de sum. Trinitate,'' n. 93. 
113. D'Argentre, "Commentarii in patrias britonum leges," art. 218, 
glosse 6, n. 47. 
114. J. Voet, "Ad pandectas,'' bk. 42, tit 1, n. 41. 
115. H ert, "Opera," I: "de collisione legum,'' s. 4, n. 73. 
116. Huber, "Praelect.,'' pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3, n. 3, 6. 
117. P. Voet, "De statutis,'' s. 4, n. 14; Huber, "Praelect.,'' pt. 2, bk. 1, 
tit. 3, n. 3, 6. 
118. H ert, "Opera,'' I, "de collisione legum," s. 4, n. 73. 
119. J. Voet, "Ad pandectas,'' bk. 42, tit. 1, n. 41. 
120. See Boullenois, "Traite de la personnalite et de la realite des 
loix,'' I, obs. 25. 
121. See Bartolus on the "Conflict of Laws" (Beale's translation), n. 
44-49; M eili, "Lehrbuch des internationalen Strafrechts und Strafprozess-
rechts,'' 37-45. 
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attention to the subject. In the seventeenth century and at the be-
ginning of the eighteenth the French practice went very far in the 
application of the law of the forum to crimes committed abroad.122 
The Dutch jurists entertained various views. Burgundus held that, 
in the absence of an express statutory provision to that effect, the 
criminal laws of the forum would not apply to crimes committed by 
subjects abroad.123 He was also of the opinion that if the state 
into which a criminal had fled was asked :to prosecute him, as might 
happen under exceptional circumstances in view of the fact that 
extradition was not granted, it could do so only in accordance with 
the lex loci delicti.124 Confiscations of property pronounced in 
criminal courts were deemed to have no application to property in 
other states.125 Paul Voet maintained that a criminal might be 
prosecuted according to the law of the forum with respect to crimes 
committed in another state.126 Foreign sentences confiscating prop-
erty were held by him to be effective everywhere as regards movables 
but not as regards immovables.121 Huber likewise holds that the 
state in which a criminal is apprehended may prosecute him for a 
crime committed a;broad, for whoever is found within a territory is, 
according to him, subject to its criminal jurisdiction.l28 He appears, 
however, to have reference solely to the question of jurisdiction and 
would recognize no doubt the application of the lex loci delicti to 
all substantive matters. With respect to the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign judgments Huber would make no distinction 
between judgments in civil and criminal matters. Both should be 
enforced, on grounds of comity, for reasons of utility and conven-
ience, unless it would cause prejudice to the state or to its citizens.129 
II 
From the foregoing presentation it may be readily inferred why 
the English courts, when toward the end of the eighteenth century 
the first cases involving a conflict of laws presented themselves for 
decision, should have accepted the doctrine of the Dutch school in 
122. M eili, "Lehrbuch des internationalen Strafrechts und Stra.fprozess-
rechts," 49. 
123. Btergundus, "Tractatus controversiarum ad consuetudines Flan-
driae," tract 5, -n. 5, 6. 
124. Ibid., n. 9, 10. "In delictis rationem loci habemus in quo sunt 
commissa" : Ibid., n. 2. 
125. Ibid., tract 3, n. 13.. 
126. P. Voet, "De statutis," s. 11, c. 1, n. 5. 
127. Ibid., s. 11, c. 2, n. 3, 4. 
128. Huber, "De jure civitatis," bk. 3, s. 4, c. 1, n. 41-42. 
129. Ibid., n. 42. 
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preference to the views entertained iby the writers of the Italian and 
French schools. According to Meili,130 the reception of the doctrine 
of the Dutch school in England was materially assisted by the fact 
that William III was at the same time king of England and 
stadtholder of Holland and that the English and especially the 
Scotch students of the law were in the habit of completing their 
legal education in Holland. The real reason for such reception lay, 
however, much deeper. Had the English lawyers and judges been 
equally familiar with the writings of the Italian, French, and Ger-
man writers they would unquestionably have accepted the theory 
advanced by the V oets and Huber, for these writers were the first 
to announce in the most unqualified manner the doctrine that all 
laws are territorial in their nature and can operate within the domain 
of another state only so far as the latter, on grounds of comity, 
consents to such operation. This viewpoint alone was acceptable 
to the Common Law of England which, owing to the strong influ-
ence of feudalism, possessed a most pronounced territorial charac-
ter. This explains also why, of the Dutch writers, Huber's treatise 
should have been cited and relied upon most. Paul Voet, it is true, 
had expressed before the fundamental views advanced by Huber, 
and from a theoretical viewpoint the doCtrines of the Dutch 
school were developed most by John Voet, whom Lainem calls on 
that account the real founder of the Dutch school. John Voet was 
no doubt the greatest of the three. Indeed, so great was his influ-
ence upon the Dutch law that he is said to occupy a position similar 
to that which Pothier occupies with, respect to French law. Al-
though Huber did not originate the doctrines of the Dutch school, 
nor develop them, he stated the fundamental position of this school 
more lucidly and concisely than did either of the other two writers. 
The three axioms mentioned by Huber at the very outset of his 
treatise and which are the comer-stones of his entire discussion, ex-
press the viewpoint of the Dutch school in the boldest and most 
categorical manner. Story gives to these maxims his unqualified 
assent.132 
The practical tone of Huber's treatise, which is illustrated by 
cases which the writer recollected from his experience as judge of 
the Frisian court, its brevity and simplicity, appealed to the Eng-
lish and American judges. The author contents himself with a 
brief statement of the principal rules and their application, without 
130. M eili, "International civil and commercial law" (Kuhn's transla-
tion), 83-84. 
131. Laine, "Introduction au droit international prive," II, 388. 
132. Story, "Conflict of L;tws," 8th ed., 31. 
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dwelling upon the many controversial points which obscure the writ-
ings of other writers. 
Huber rejects the classification of statutes into personal, real 
and mixed-a classification adopted by Paul and John Voet-and 
proposes. to solve all problems upon the basis of the axioms men-
tioned. The above division seems nevertheless to underlie his dis-
cussion of the subject. Although he states so nowhere expressly, 
and in some respects leaves the matter in doubt, he admits that all 
questions affecting immovable property directly, excepting matters 
of form, are subject to the lex rei sitae. He recognizes also, at 
least as regards status, that the personal statute will be given extra-
territorial effect on grounds of comity. 
Even if the correctness of the general maxims laid down by 
Huber is admitted as the fundamental basis upon which the Con-
flict of Laws must rest, much doubt may be experienced in their 
application to individual problems. Huber's own deductions are at 
times quite uncertain and in other instances quite arbitrary. For 
example, if the principle of temporary subjection, which Huber 
adopts as his second maxim, is sound, it should logically apply to all 
questions of capacity, and yet Huber's statements with respect to 
this important matter are obscure and it is very questionable to 
what extent they harmonize with the above axiom. If a person is 
subject to the law of the place in which he acts, whence dof'_c; Huber 
derive the rule that the intentiop. of the parties contrqls the obliga-
tion of contracts ? If matters affecting immovables directly are to 
be excepted from the operation of the lex loci actus and to be sub-
mitted to the lex rei sitae-a proposition which is nowhere clearly 
stated by Huber-why should not the formal execution of instru-
ments disposing of such property be subject logically to the law of 
the situs? And yet Huber applies the rule locus regit actum. How 
can the rule that the transfer of mova'bles is governed by the lex 
domicilii be reconciled with the general maxims? Surely the con-
clusions stated by Huber cannot be derived all by mere logic from 
the maxims announced. It must not be forgotten, however, that 
Huber's object was to write a practical treatise which should state 
the existing law. Had he amplified his statements he would have 
admitted, without question, that some of the rules laid down., by 
him could not be derived from his general. principles but had found 
general recognition on grounds of convenience. 
The Belgian jurist, Alberic Rolin, speaking of Huber, says :m 
133. Rolin, "Principes du droit international prive," I, 79. 
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"His doctrine, however, is badly reasoned and little scientific. It 
is summed up in several axioms, stated quite arbitrarily, from which 
the author draws his deductions. We place above him immeasurably 
the jurist we have just mentioned, John Voet, whose influence upon the 
law of his country seems to us to have been more considerable." 
We may contrast with this the following estimate from the 
pen of Professor Harrison. He says :134 
"But there is a special point in regard to which Ulrich Huber 
differs from the other civil jurists. All these writers, though they pos-
sess much good sense, learning, and practical wisdom, strove to dis-
tinguish between personal and real statutes. That was, as has been 
stated, an absolutely futile inquiry, which was devoid of all r~ality. I£ 
Ulrich Huber's treatise rests on the same basis, it furnishes nevertheless 
something in addition. Huber's treatise "de conflictu legum" is only a 
short essay, forming part of his introduction to the civil law, and is 
contained within five quarto pages. . . They are characterized by 
clearness, practical judgment and an entire absenC.J! of pedantry. The 
rules laid down within those five pages are satisfactory and exact. The 
matter is not exhausted, it is true, and the maxims are very general. 
But, at the same time, they establish the bases of Private International 
Law and deal with the subject in conformity with our modern ideas. 
"In the seventeenth century Private International Law was in the 
hands of the Dutch; in the following it belonged to the French. But 
the latter have added nothing to the general principles of the science. 
It must suffice to cite the names of D' Aguesseau, Bouhier, Froland, and 
Boullenois, who lived in the first half of the eighteenth century, in the 
great period which preceded· the era of the French revolution. Their 
works contain ingenious remarks with respect to special cases; but none 
of these authors succeeded in adding a single scientific principle to 
Huber's three famous rules, and all accepted the old useless method 
which attempted to classify the statutes instead of analyzing the legal 
relations." 
Concerning the influence of the Dutch school upon the develop-
ment of the Conflict of Laws, Meili's words probably express the 
general verdict among the modern continental jurists.135 He says :136 
"It has been said for a time that the Dutch writers opened the way 
for the development of Private International Law-les jurisconsultes 
des Pays-B~s ont frayes Ia route-as Foelix has asserted.181 The Dutch 
school has in fact put the Conflict of Laws out of joint and has placed 
the whole subject on a basis where it nearly perished. At all events it 
134. Clunet, Journal du droit international prive, VII, 428. 
135. Some take a less radical view. See Catellani, "II diritto inter-
nazionale privato," I, 454 et seq. One of the late French writers on the 
Conflict of Laws defends the theory of the Dutch writers: Vareilles-Som-
mieres, "La synthese du droit international prive," I, 8, 78-97. 
136. M eili, in Niemeyer's Zeitschrift fiir internationales Privat- und 
Strafrecht, VIII, 190. 
137. Foelix, "Traite du droit international prive," I, 4th ed., 15. 
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blocked the way to its future development. Retrogression and not 
progress resulted from this school. Every day we still feel the reflex 
effect of this erroneous doctrine. The Dutch writers prepared a jurid-
ical blind alley for our subject in the form of comitas. This is the 
truth and all else is fiction." 
"Comity," says another writer/38 
"is a pretext for the evasion· of the consequences of a strict territorial 
law. After the notion of such law is denied, it would be idle to combat 
it, for it becomes unnecessary. But it may not be amiss to observe that 
in its obscure and little defined concept, interest, courtesy, and reciproc-
ity, ideas so important for the history of law, play a part. • • . The 
name of science cannot be given to them, nor can a practical and useful 
system be based upon them. They authorize simply concessions ungov-
erned by rule, the supposed independence of a state consisting in an ad-
justment of its conduct to that followed by other states, resulting ulti-
mately in a real isolation between the people of the different countries, 
and in making of courtesy and reciprocity a system of reprisal, instead 
of a furtherance of juridical relations." 
The Anglo-American view is stated nowhere better than in the 
following words of Story :189 
"It has been thought by some jurists that the term comity is not 
sufficiently expressive of the obligation of nations to give effect to for-
eign laws when they are not prejudicial to their own rights and inter-
ests. And it has been suggested that the doctrine rests on a deeper 
foundation; that it is not so much a matter of comity or courtesy as a 
matter of paramount moral duty. Now assuming that such a moral 
duty does exist, it is clearly one of imperfect obligation, like that of 
beneficence, humanity, and charity. Every nation must be the final 
judge for itself, not only of the nature and the extent of the duty, but 
of the occasions on which its exercise may be justly demanded. And 
certainly there can be no pretense to say that any foreign nation has a 
right to require the full recognition and execution of its own laws in 
other territories, when those laws are deemed oppressive or injurious 
to the rights or interests of the inhabitants of the latter, or when their 
moral character is questionable, or their provisions are impolitic or 
unjust. . 
"The true foundation on which the administration of international 
law must rest is, that the rules which are to govern are those which 
arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconven-
iences which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of 
moral necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in 
return. • 
"There is then not only no impropriety in the use of the phrase 
'comity of nations,' but it is the most appropriate phrase to express 
the true foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one 
138. Bustamante, "Tratado de derecho internacional privado,'' I, 456. 
139. Story, "Conflict of Laws," 8th ed., 32, 33, 35. 
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nation within the territories of another. It is derived altogether from 
the voluntary consent of the· latter, and is inadmissible when it is 
contrary to its known policy or prejudicial to its interests. In the 
silence of any po-sitive rule affirming or denying or restraining the 
operation of foreign laws, courts of justice presume the tacit adoption 
of them by their government, unless they are repugnant to its policy or 
prejudicial to its interests. It is not comity of the courts, but the 
comity of the nation, which is administered and ascertained in the same 
way, and guided by the same reasoning by which all other principles of 
the municipal law are ascertained and guided." 
Such a difference in the appreciation of the Dutch school, and 
of Huber in particular, as appears from the quotations above given, 
must be due to a difference in the fundamental conception concern-
ing the nature and legal basis of the subject of Private International 
Law. This is indeed the true explanation. The word "comity" on 
the continent stands opposed to "justice." It was in. this sense 
that the Dutch writers probably used it. Huber does not say so in 
so many words but John Voet does. He says that foreign laws are 
admitted "ex comitate . . . . liberaliter et officiose . . . . 
nullo alioquin ad id jure obstricto.''140 Although Huber was not 
the originator of the theory of comity he was nevertheless the first 
to give prominence to the idea through his maxims, and became 
thus in large measure responsible for its popularization. The no-
tion of justice and comity are, however, not necessarily dis-
associated. 
"Once the tacit existence of comity is admitted," says Catel-
lani/u 
"it can be derived only from custom and the decisions of courts, and in 
the one case as well as in the other it becomes an effect and manifesta-
tion of the popular conscience whose constant direction indicates to the 
judges what they ought to regard as the tacit will of the state. Comity 
in this sense, and so modified in its original meaning, becomes an ele-
ment which may be rendered a more and more perfect vehicle for the 
development of Private International Law. In each age it will reflect 
the consciousness, rooted more and more firmly in the popular con-
science, of what corresponds to the common advantage of all the states 
and all mankind. And when this conscience becomes later conscious 
also of the existing solidarity between the states and the international 
rights of individuals, both will find in the notion of comity the same 
sanction through the tacit will of the state." 
.Jt was in this juridical sense that the term comity came to be 
actually understood. Says Westlake :u2 
140. J. Voet, "Ad pandectas," bk 1, tit. 4, pt. 2, n. 1. 
141. Catellani, "It diritto internazionale privato," I, 454-55. 
142. Westlake, "Private International Law," 5th ed., 22-23. 
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"While English writers and judges freely borrowed the term 
'comity' from John Voet and Huber, it may be doubted whether they 
meant it strictly in a sense independent of justice. Although on the 
continent comity and justice are usually regarded as forming an antith-
esis, it is probable that in this country the prevailing view has been 
that while a concession is made in not determining every question by 
the lex fori, that concession is dictated not only by a convenience 
amounting to necessity, but also by deference· to a science of law em-
bodying justice, which the law of the land was deemed to have adopted 
as governing its own interpretation and application, and from which it 
was conceived that the rules of comity were drawn." 
Huber was a positivist who stated fearlessly what he believed 
to be the actual law. He saw that the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign law depended upon the assent of the state called 
upon to recognize or enforce the alleged right. A foreign law 
could have no effect ipso jure outside the territory of the enacting 
state. It must be recognized or accepted, that is incorporated, by 
the law of the forum. This is Huber's doctrine in essence. This 
is also the standpoint of the Anglo-American law and of the con-
tinental courts. The foreign doctrinal writers are not satisfied, 
however, with this conception of the Conflict of Laws.1~3 Their 
aim is to plant the science of Private International Law upon a 
foundation more stable than that of comity. No uniformity can 
ever be !tttained, according to them, if each state is free to adopt 
those rules of the Conflict of Laws which appear to it most con-
venient and useful. They seek to derive the rules of the Conflict 
of Laws, therefore, from a source that shall be superior to the 
internal law of each state, and this source they conceive to be In-
ternational Law. Instead of being a part of the internal law of 
each state, the rules of the Conflict of Laws constitute, in their 
opinion, a universal system which imposes its rules upon the indi-
v-idual states from without. According to this conception, the rules 
of the Conflict of Laws are in reality rules defining the jurisdiction 
of the different states, the limits of each being determined by In-
ternational Law. As the positive International Law of today has 
developed very few principles relating to our subject,144 each jurist 
143. See Pillet, "Principes de droit international prive," Paris and 
Grenoble, 1903; Zitelmam~. "J.ntemationales Privatrecht," Leipzig, Vol. 1 
(2d ed.), 1912, Vol. 2 (1st ed.}, 1903. 
144. "Pillet be1ieves in a compulsive force of universal law, exercised 
alike on Sovereigns and private individuals, or perhaps through Sovereigns 
on private individuals. Neither the comity theorists nor Dicey believe in it. 
I believe in it, but I think it is very easy to exaggerate its content. Philli-
more's views are very much mine, and I respectfully refer to them ("Inter-
national Law," IV, §§ 4, 5). In more recent days, those of Professor Kahn 
("Natur und Methode des internationalen Privatrechts"), cited by Pillet, 
approach very nearly to the same thesis": Baty, "Polarized Law," 168. 
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must needs be guided in the formulation of the fundamental prin-
ciples ·by his own sense of justice, and assume, as it were, the role 
of an international legislator. 
The continental jurists recognize that in certain matters affect-
ing its social and economic interests each state must be free to 
exclude the operation of foreign law within its territory. The rules 
governing in this regard are called rules of "public order." Con-
cerning the meaning and application of these rules there is hope-
less disagreement. If the conclusions reached in individual in-
stances are simil~r to, or identical with, those obtained upon the 
basis of the doctrines of the Dutch school, the fundamental differ-
ence in the scientific viewpoint of the internationalists and the posi-
tivists must not be overlooked. The continental jurists are theo-
rists who believe that the harmonious development of the science of 
Private International Law can be promoted best through. the elab-
oration of an ideal legal system, without reference to the existing 
law. The Anglo-American lawyers and judges, on the other hand, 
are positivists, who understand by the term "law" rules which are 
recognized and enforced by courts of justice. They find it difficult 
to see how good can result from a discussion of principles which 
ex-ist only in the mind of the particular writer. 
That these discussions have not resulted in a communis opinio 
doctorum, which might have a beneficial effect upon the develop-
ment of the Conflict of Laws, is known to all acquainted with the 
continental literature on the subject. It is difficult to find a sub-
ject with reference to which there is so much disagreement. Solid 
progress can be made only if the juristic discussions keep in touch 
with actual life and positive law. A uniform system of tlie Conflict 
of Laws that shall have force in the different countries will never 
exist as long as there are independent states. All that is humanly 
attainable is a greater uniformity than that now existing. Before 
much can be accomplished in this direction there must exist a bet-
ter understanding of foreign legal systems, and a greater degree 
of .trust and confidence in such systems. As long as each country 
feels at heart that its own law is the best in the world, and that 
justice can be secured only in accordance with its rules, there is 
little hope of any real progress. As the solidarity of nations comes 
more into evidence and the justice of enforcing foreign laws under 
given circumstances becomes more apparent, the different systems 
will gradually tend towards ·greater uniformity. During this proc-
ess the fundamental conceptions concerning the Conflict of Laws 
entertained by Huber, though imperfectly developed by him, will 
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constitute a secure foundation. Instead of having almost destroyed 
the science of Private International Law, as Meili has asserted, the 
Dutch jurists were the first to have any real conception of such a 
science. Huber's axioms must, in the nature of things, govern our 
subject until the complete sovereignty of the individual states is lost 
and a common superior has been established. 
As long as there remains between the Anglo-American and con-
tinental writers such a wide difference in their conception of "law" 
and the science of law, there will naturally remain also the same 
wide difference of opinion in their estimation of Ulrich Huber and 
of the Dutch school in general. 
APPENDIX 
DE CONFLICTU LEGUM DIVERS.ARUM 
IN DIVERSIS IMPERIIS1 
1. Origo et usus hujtts Quaesiti, 
forensis quidem, at juris 
Gentimn magis quam civilis. 
2. Regulae fmtdamentales hujus 
doctrinae. 
3. Acta inter vivos et mortis 
causa valent ubique secun-
dum jus loci, quo ·celebran-
tur. 
4. Quod exemplo declaratur, tes-
tamenti. 
5. Contractus. 
6. Rei Judicatae. 
7. Actionis instituendae. 
8. Matrimonii. 
9. Extendi hoc etiam ad effectus 
eamm rerum, etiam quod ad 
immobilia. 
10. Liinitatio regulae de loco. 
11. Alia limitatio ejusque ampli-
atio. 
12. Regula de qualitatibus person-
alibus certo loco impressis, 
OF THE CONFLICT OF DIVERSE LAWS 
IN DIVERSE GOVERNMENTS 
1. Origin and use of this ques-
tion, forensic indeed, but be-
longing to international rath-
er than to civil law. 
2. The fundamental rules of the 
subject. 
3. Acts inter vivos and mortis 
causa are valid everywhere 
according to the law of the 
place where they are done. 
4. Its application to wills. 
5. Its application to contracts. 
6. Its application to res judicata. 
7. Its application to the bringing 
of actions. 
8. Its application to marriage. 
9. The extension of the rule to 
the effect of the above trans-
actions and even with re-
spect to immovables. 
10. Limitation of the rule of the 
place. 
11. Another limitation and its 
· amplification. 
12. The rule that personal quali-
ties impressed by a certain 
1. The text "follows the second edition of Huber's "Praelectionum Juris 
civilis tomi tres,'' Leipzig, 1707, a copy of which may be found in the library 
of the Harvard Law School. The splendid collection of works on the Con-
flict of Laws contained in this library has been placed generously at the 
disposal of the writer. 
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ubique vim habentibus. 
13. Scilicet, qttalem ejusmodi per-
sonae jure cttjusque loci ha-
bent: ut exemplis declaratur. 
14. In jure immobilium spectari 
jus loci, quo sita sunt. 
15. Declaratur exemplis Testa-
menti, Contractttum et Suc-
cessionis ab intestato. 
1. Saepe fit, ut negotia in uno 
loco contracta usum effectumque 
in diversi ( s) locis imperii babe-
ant, aut alibi dijudicanda sint. 
Notum est porro, leges et statuta 
singulorum populorum multis par-
tibus discrepare, posteaquam dis-
sipatis imperii Romani provinciis, 
divisus est orbis Christianus in 
populos ferme innumeros, sibi 
mutuo non subjectos, nee ejusdem 
ordinis imperandi parendique 
consortes. In jure Romano non 
est mirum nihil hac de re exstare, 
cum populi Rom. per omnes orbis 
partes diffusum et aequabili jure 
gubernatum Imperium, conflictui 
diversarum Legum non aeque po-
tuerit esse subjectum. Regulae 
tamen fundamentales, secundum 
quas hujus rei judicium regi de-
bet, ex ipso jure Rom. videntur 
esse petendae; quanquam ipsa 
quaestio magis ad jus Gentium 
quam ad jus Civile pertineat, qua-
tenus quid diversi populi inter se 
servare debeant, ad juris Gentium 
rationes pertinere manifestum est. 
Nos ad detegendam hujus intri-
catissimae quaestionis subtilita-
tem, tria, collocabimus axiomata, 
place have force every-
where. 
13. It is manifest to what sort of 
limitation such persons are 
subject according to the law 
of each place, as will be 
shown by examples. 
14. As regards immovables the 
law of the situs must be con-
sulted. 
15. This is shown by examples 
from the law of wills, con-
tracts, and intestate succes-
sion. 
1. It often happens that trans-
actions entered into in one place 
have force and effect in a differ-
ent country or are judicially de-
cided upon in another place. It 
is well known, furthermore, that 
after the breaking up of the prov-
inces of the Roman Empire and 
the division of the Christian 
world into almost innumerable 
nations, being not subject one to 
the other, nor sharing the same 
mode of government, the laws of 
the different nations disagree in 
many respects. It is not surpris-
ing that there is nothing in the 
Roman law on the subject inas-
much as the Roman dominion, 
covering as it did all parts of the 
globe and ruling the same with a 
uniform law, could not give rise 
to a conflict of different laws. 
The fundamental rules according 
to which this question should be 
decided must be found, however, 
in the Roman law itself. Al-
though the matter belongs rather 
to the law of nations than to the 
civil law, it is manifest that what 
the different nations observe 
among themselves belongs to the 
law of nations. For the purpose 
of solving the subtlety of this 
most intricate question, we shall 
lay down three maxims which be-
ing conceded as they should be 
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quae concessa, sicut omnino con-
cedenda videntur, viam nobis ad 
reliqua planam redditura videntur. 
2. Sunt autem hae: I. Leges 
cujusque imperii vim habettt in-
tra terminos ejusdem reip. om-
nesque ·ei subjectos obligant, nee 
ultra, per l. ult. fl. de Jurisdict. 
II. Pro subjectis imperio habendi 
sunt omnes, qui intra terminos 
ejusdem reperiuntur, sive in per-
petmtm, sive ad tempus ibi com-
morentur, per l. 7, s IO. itt fin. de 
interd. et releg. III. Rectores im-
periorum id comiter agunt, ut j~tra 
cujusque populi intra terminos 
ejus e~ercita, teneant ubique 
suam vim, quatemts ttihil potestati 
aut juri alterius imperantis 
ejusque civium praej2tdicetur. E~ 
quo liquet, bane rem non ex sim-
plici jure Civili, sed ex commodis 
et tacito populorum consensu esse 
petendam: quia sicut leges alter-
ius populi apud alium directe va-
lere non possunt, ita commerciis 
et usu gentium promiscuo nihil 
foret magis incommodum, quam 
si res jure certi loci validae, mox 
alibi diversitate Juris infirmaren-
tur, quae est ratio tertii axiomat-
is: quod, uti nee prius, nullum 
videtur habere dubium. ·De se-
CU!J.dO videntur aliqui secus ar-
bitrari, quando peregrinos legibus 
loci, in quibus agunt, teneri ne-
gant. Quod in quibusdam casibus 
esse verum fatemur et videbimus 
infra: sed bane positionem, pro 
subjectis imperio habendos omnes, 
qui infra fines ejusdem agunt, cer-
everywhere will smooth our way 
for the solution of the remaining 
questions. 
2. They are these: 
( 1) The laws of each state 
have force within the limits of 
that government and bind all sub-
ject to it, but not beyond (Digest, 
2, 1, 20). 
(2) All persons within the lim-
its of a government, whether they 
live there permanently or tempo-
rarily, are deemed to be subjects 
thereof (Digest, 48, 22, 7, §10, 
i.f.). 
(3) Sovereigns will so act by 
way of comity that rights acquired 
within the limits of a government 
retain their force everywhere so 
far as they do not cause preju-
dice to the power or rights of 
such government or of its sub-
jects. 
It follows, therefore, that the so-
lution of the problem must be de-
rived not exclusively from the 
civil law, but from convenience 
and the tacit consent of nations. 
Although the laws of one nation 
can have no force directly with 
another, yet nothing could be more 
inconvenient to commerce and to 
international usage than that 
transactions valid by the law of 
one place should be rendered of 
no effect elsewhere on account of 
a difference in the law. And 
that is the reason for the third 
maxim concerning which hitherto 
no doubt appears to have been 
entertained. As for the second 
maxim, some persons seem to be 
of a different opinion and to deny 
that foreigners are subject to the 
law of the place in which they 
act. I consider this to be true in 
certain cases, as we shall see be-
low. But the proposition that all 
within. the boundaries of a gov-
ernment are to be deemed subjects 
HeinOnline  -- 13 Ill. L. R.  404 1918-1919
404 ERNEST G. LORENZEN 
tissimam esse, cum natura Rei-
pub!. et mos subigendi imperio 
cunctos in civitate repertos, tum 
id, quod de arresto personali apud 
omnes fere gentes receptum est, 
arguit. Grotius 2. c. II. n. S· Qui 
in loco aliquo contrahit tanquam 
subditus temporarius legibus loci 
subjicitur. Nee enim ulla ratione 
freti sunt, qui peregrinos, sine 
alia causa, quam quod ibi reperi-
untur, Arresto medio, illic juri 
sistere se cogunt, quam quod im-
perium in omnes, qui intra fines 
suos reperiuntur, sibi competere 
intelligunt. 
3. Inde fluit haec Positio : 
Cuncta negotia et acta tam in 
jttdicio quam extra judicium, seu 
mortis causa sive inter vivos, se-
ctmdwm jus certi loci rite cele-
brata valent, etiam ubi diversa 
juris observatio viget, ac ubi sic 
inita, quemadmodum facta sunt, 
non valerent. E contra, negotia 
et acta certo loco contra leges 
ejus loci celebrata, cum sint ab in-
itio invalida, nusquam valere pos-
sunt; idque non modo respectu 
hominum, qui in loco contractus 
habent domicilium, sed et illorum, 
qui ad tempus ibidem commoran-
tur. Sub hac tamen ex.ceptione; 
si rectores alterius populi ex.inde 
notabili incommodo afficerentur, 
ut hi talibus actis atque negotiis 
usum effectumque dare non tene-
antur, secundum tertii axiomatis 
limitationem. Digna res est, quae 
exemplis declaretur. 
thereof is nevertheless perfectly 
correct, for it is in conformity 
not only with the nature of a 
state and the custom of subjecting 
all found therein to its sovereign-
ty, but also with the doctrine ac-
cepted by almost all nations con-
cerning personal arrest. Grotius, 
2, c. 11, n. 5, says that he who 
contracts in any particular place 
subjects himself as a temporary 
subject to the laws of such place. 
For the doctrine that foreigners 
are compelled to submit to mesne 
arrest, for no other reason than 
that they are found in a place, 
can be justified only on the 
ground that the sovereignty is 
deemed to extend over all found 
within the territory. 
3. From the above the follow-
ing principle is derived; all trans-
actions and acts, in court as well 
as out, whether mortis causa or 
inter vivos, rightly done accord-
ing to the law of any particular 
place, are valid even where a dif-
ferent law prevails, and where, 
had they been so done, they would 
not have been valid. On the 
other hand, transactions and acts 
done in violation of the law of 
that place, since they are invalid 
from the beginning, cannot be 
valid anywhere; and this is true 
not only as regards persons hav-
ing their domicile in the place of 
the contract, but also as regards 
those who are there for the time 
being. With this exception, nev-
ertheless, if the sovereigns of an-
other nation should be affected 
thereby with a serious inconven-
ience they would not be bound to 
give force and effect to such acts 
and transactions, according to the 
restriction laid down in the third 
maxim. The matter is important 
enough to be illustrated by ex-
amples. 
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4, In Hollandia testamentum 
fieri potest coram notario et duo-
bus testibus, in Frisia non valet, 
nisi septem testibus corfirmatum. 
Batavus fecit testamentum more 
loci in Hollandia, ex quo bona, 
quae sita. sunt in Frisia, illic pe-
tuntur. Quaeritur, an judices 
Frjsii secundum illud testamen-
tum vindicias dare debeant. Leges 
Hollandiae non possunt obligare 
Frisios, ideoque per axioma prim-
mn testamentum illud in Frisia 
non valeret, sed per axioma ter-
tium valor ejus sustinetur et se-
cundum illud jus dicitur. Sed 
Frisius proficiscitur in Hol-
landiam, ibique facit testamentum 
more loci contra jus . Frisicum, 
redit in Frisiam ibique diem obit, 
valetue testamentum? valebit, per 
a.·doma sectmdmn, quia dum fuit 
in Hollandia, licet ad tempus, jure 
loci tenebatur, actusque ab initio 
validus ubique valere debet, per 
axioma tertium, idque sine dis-
crimine mobilium et immobilium 
bonorum, ut juris est ac observa-
tur. Frisius e contra facit in pa-
tria testamentum coram N otario 
cum duobus testibus, profertur in 
Hollandia, ibique bona sita pe-
tuntur, non fiet adjudicatio, quia 
testamentum inde ab initio fuit 
nullum, utpote factum contra jus 
loci. Quin idem juris erit, si 
Batavus heic in Frisia tale testa-
mentum condat, etsi in Hollandia 
factum valeret; verum enim est, 
quod heic ita factum ab initio 
4. In Holland a will can be 
made before a notary and two 
witnesses. In Frisia it is not 
valid unless attested by seven wit-
nesses. A Dutch subject made a 
will in Holland, in accordance 
with the custom of the place, by 
virtue· of which property situated 
in Frisia is demanded in that 
place. The question is whether 
the judges of Frisia should allow 
him to vindicate the property in 
accordance with such will. The 
laws of Holland cannot bind the 
Frisians ; therefore, according to 
the first maxim, such will would 
not be valid in Frisia, but by the 
third maxim its validity would be 
supported, and by that the will is 
sustained. But suppose that a 
Frisian goes to Holland, where he 
makes a will in conformity with 
the law of the place but contrary 
to Frisian law, and returns to 
Frisia, where he dies. Is the will 
valid? It is valid according to 
the second maxim, because while 
he was in Holland, although only 
temporarily, he was bound by the 
law of the place; and an act, valid 
from the beginning, should be 
valid everywhere, in accordance 
with the third maxim, without 
distinction between movable and 
immovable property, and such is 
the actual law. A Frisian, on the 
other harid, makes in his own 
country a will before a notary and 
two witnesses. It is carried into 
Holland, and a demand is made of 
the things found there. Recovery 
is denied because the will was in-
valid from the beginning, having 
been made contrary to the law of 
the place. And the same thing 
would be true if a Dutch subject 
should make such a will in Frisia, 
although it would have been valid 
if made in Holland; for a will 
made here in this manner would 
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fuerit nullum, per ea, quae modo 
dicta fuerunt. 
5. Quod de testamentis habu-
imus, locum etiam habet in acti-
bus inter vivos; proinde con-
tractus celebrati secundum jus 
loci, in quo contrahuntur, ubique 
tam in jure quam extra judicium, 
etiam ubi hoc modo celebrati non 
valerent, sustinentur; idque non 
tantum de forma, sed etiam de 
materia contractus affirmandum 
est. E%. gr. In certo loco merces 
quaedam prohibitae sunt; si ven-
dantur ibi, contractus est nullus : 
verum si merx eadem alibi sit 
vendita, ubi non erat interdicta, 
et ex eo contractu agatur in locis, 
ubi interdictum viget, emptor con-
demnabitur; quia contractus inde 
ab initio validus fuit. V erum si 
merces venditae, in altero loco, 
ubi prohibitae sunt, essent traden-
dae, jam non fieret condemnatio; 
quia repugnaret hoc juri et com-
modo Reip. quae merces prohibuit, 
secundum limitationem axiomatis 
tertii. Ex adverso, si clam fuer-
int venditae merces, in loco, ubi 
prohibitae sunt, emptio venditio 
non valet ab initio nee parit ac-
tionem, quocunque loco institu-
atur, utique ad traditionem urgen-
dam: nam si traditione facta, pre-
tium solvere nollet emptor~ non 
tam e contractu quam re obli-
garetur, quatenus cum alterius 
damno locupletior fieri vellet. 
be void from the beginning for 
the reasons just stated. 
5. What we have said about 
wills applies also to acts inter 
vivos. Contracts made in accord-
ance with the law of the place 
where they are entered into will 
therefore be supported every-
where, in court as well as out, 
even in those places where con-
tracts entered into in such man-
ner would not be valid. And this 
may be affirmed not only with re-
spect to the form of the contract 
but also as regards its substance. 
For example: In a certain place 
particular kinds of merchandise 
are forbidden to be sold. If they 
are sold in such a place the con-
tract is void. But if the same 
merchandise were sold in some 
other place, where it is not pro-
hibited, and suit is brought on the 
contract where the prohibition 
exists, the purchaser will be held 
because the contract was valid 
from the beginning. If the goods 
are to be delivered, however, in 
a place where they are prohibited, 
no recovery can be had because 
it would be repugnant to the law 
and interests. of the state prohib-
iting the sale of such goods, ac-
cording to the restriction con-
tained in the third maxim. On 
the other hand, if the merchan-
dise, should be sold secretly, in the 
place where such sale is prohib-
ited, the sale would not be valid 
from the beginning and no action 
will lie no matter where it may 
be brought, not even to compel 
the delivery; for if the purchaser 
should refuse to pay the price 
after delivery he would be bound 
not so much by virtue of the agree-
ment as by the delivery of the 
thing, in so far as he would en-
rich himself at the expense of an-
other. 
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6. Similem usum habet haec ob-
servatio in rebus judicatis. Senten-
tia in aliquo loco pronuntiata, vel 
delicti venia ab eo, qui jurisdic-
tionem illam habet, data, ubique 
habet effectum, nee fas est alter-
ius Reipub. magistratibus, Reum 
alibi absolutum veniave donatum, 
licet absque justa causa, persequi 
aut itentm permittere accusan-
dum; Rursus sub hac exceptione; 
nisi ad aliam Rempubl. evidens 
inde periculum aut incommodum 
resultare queat; ut hoc exemplo 
constare potest nostrae memoriae. 
Titius in Frisiae finibus homine 
percusso in capite, qui sequenti 
nocte, sanguine multo e naribus 
emisso, at bene potus atque ce-
natus, erat exstinctus; Titius, in-
quam, evasit in Transisulaniam. 
Ibi captus, ut videtur volens, mox 
judicatus et absolutus est, tan-
quam homine non ex vulnere ex-
stincto. Haec sententia mittitur 
in Frisiam et petitur impunitas rei 
absoluti. Quanquam ratio abso-
lutionis non erat a fide veri aliena, 
tamen Curia Frisiae vim senten-
tiae veniamque reo polliceri, 
Transisulanis licett postulantibus, 
gravata est. Quia tali in viciniam 
effugio et processu adfectato, jur-
isdictioni Frisiontm eludendae via 
nimis parata futura videbatur, 
quae est tertii axiomatis excep-
tionis ratio. Idem obtinet in sen-
tentHs rentm Civilium, quo per-
tinet sequens exemplum memoriae 
quoque nostrae. Civis Harli1tg-
anus contractum iniverat cum 
Groningano, seque submiserat 
6. The above ntle applies 
equally to the subject of res ju-
dicata. A sentence pronounced 
in any place, or the pardon of a 
crime granted by one having 
jurisdiction, will have effect ev-
erywhere. Nor is it lawful for 
the magistrates of another state 
to prosecute, or suffer to be prose-
cuted a second time, one who has 
been acquitted or pardoned in an-
other place, although without a 
sufficient reason; with this excep-
tion again, that no evident danger 
or prejudice will result therefrom 
to such othe:F state, as may be 
seen from the following case 
within our memory. Titius 
struck a man on the head upon 
Frisian territory. The man hav-
ing lost much blood through his 
nose, and having eaten and drunk 
heartily, died during the follow-
ing night. Titius escaped into 
Transylvania. Being apprehended 
there, voluntarily as it seems, he is 
tried at once and acquitted as if 
the man had not died from the 
wound. This sentence is sent to 
Frisia and freedom from punish-
ment is asked on behalf of the 
person acquitted. Although the 
reason for the acquittal may not 
have been untrue, it was never-
theless a serious question with the 
court of Frisia whether it should 
give effect to the foreign sentence 
and excuse the delinquent, al-
though requested by the Transyl-
vanians ; for such an escape into 
the neighboring country and pre-
tended prosecution appear to pre-
pare the way too much for an 
evasion of the Frisian law, which 
is the basis of the exception un-
der the third maxim. The same 
is true of judgments respecting 
civil matters, as is seen from the 
following example which is also 
within our memory. A citizen of 
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judicibus Groninganis. Vi sub- Harlem made a contract with a 
missionis hujus Groningam citat- citizen of Groningen, in which he 
submitted hip1self to the judges 
of Groningen. Being cited to ap-
pear before the courts of Gron-
us, et cum non sisteret se, con-
demnatus fuerat, quasi per con-
tumaciam. Petita executione du- ingen, by virtue of this submis-
sion, and not appearing he is con-
bitatum est, an concedenda foret, demned as contumacious. Execu-
in curia Frisica. Dubitandi ratio, tion of the judgment being sought 
from a Frisian court, it was 
quod vi submissionis, si reus in doubted whether it ought to be 
territorio judicis, cui se submisit, granted. The reason of doubting 
was that if the defendant was not 
found in the territory to whose 
judges he had submitted, he could 
not be proceeded against as con-
tumacious, as we shall see else-
where. Nor can effect be given 
to such judgments without detri-
ment to our jurisdiction or preju-
non reperiatur, nemo co~tuma­
ciae peragi llossit, ut alibi videbi-
mus : neque sine detrimento juris-
dictionis nostrae et praejudicio 
civium nostratium talibus sen-
tentiis effectus dari queat. Con- dice to our citizens. It was 
cessa tamen est eo tempore; qui- granted, however, at that time, 
busdam Dominis ita censentibus; certain magistrates being of the 
opinion that the Frisians could 
not be allowed to inquire by what 
principle the judgment of Gron-
ingen had been pronounced, but 
only whether it was valid accord-
ing to the law of the place. Oth-
quod Frisiis non liceret arbitrari, 
quo jure sententia Groningae lata 
esset, modo secundum jus loci 
valeret. Alii hac ratione; quod 
Magistratus Harlinganus in urbe ers advance the reason that the 
magistrate at Harlem on request 
had granted a citation in his city, 
which he ought rather not to have 
done. Moreover, I recollect the 
fact that the magistrates in Am-
sterdam deny the execution of 
judgments by default, the defend-
ant having been cited before a 
Frisian court by an order based 
upon submission and having been 
condemned without being heard, 
and in my opinion correctly, on 
account of the restriction con-
sua requisitus citationem permis-
erat, quod facere potius non de-
buisset. Alioqui Amstelodam-
enses negavisse executionem sen-
tentiae latae in absentem, per 
Edictum vi submissionis citatum 
ad Curiam Frisicam, et nemine 
contradicente damnatum, memini 
factum et recte meo judicio; prop-
ter limitationem axiomatis tertii 
commemoratam. tained in the third maxim. 
7. Praeterea dubitatum est, si 7. Again, the question has been 
ex contractu alibi celebrato, apud raised whether if suit is brought 
nos actio instituatur, atque in ista here upon a contract made else-
where, and our law with respect 
actione danda vel neganda aliud to the allowing or denying the ac-
juris apud nos, aiiud esset, ubi tion differs from that of the place 
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contractus erat initus, utrius loci 
jus servandum foret. Exemplum: 
Frisius in Hollandia debitor factus 
ex causa mercium particulatim 
venditarum, convenitur in Frisia 
post biennium. Opponit Prae-
scriptionem apud nos in ejusmodi 
debitis receptam. Creditor repli-
cat, in Hollandia, ubi contractus 
initus erat, ejusmodi praescrip-
tionem non esse receptam; Pro-
in de sibi non obstare in hac causa. 
Sed aliter judicatum est, semel in 
causa Justi Blenkenfieldt contra 
G. Y., iterum inter J oham~em Jon-
oliin, Sartorem Principis Aurau-
sionensis contra N. B., utraque 
ante magnas ferias z68o. Eadem 
ratione, si quis debitorem in 
Frisia conveniat ex instrumento 
coram Scabinis in Hollandia cere-
brato, quod ibi, non jure com-
mu_ni, habet paratam executionem, 
id heic eam vim non habebit, sed 
opus erit causae cognitione et 
sententia. Ratio haec est, quod 
praescriptio et executio non per-
tinent ad valorem contractus, sed 
ad tempus et modum actionis in-
stituendae, quae per se quasi 
contractum separatumque nego-
tium constituit, adeoque receptum 
est optima ratione, ut in ordinan-
dis judiciis, loci consuetudo, ubi 
agitur, etsi de negotio alibi cele-
brato, spectetur, ut docet. San-
dius lib. I, tit. I2, def. s, ubi 
tradit, etiam in executione sen-
t~ntiae alibi latae, servari jus, in 
where the contract was made, 
which law ought to govern? For 
example, a Frisian who becomes 
indebted in Holland, on account of 
merchandise sold there at retail, 
is sued in Frisia after the expira-
tion of two years. He pleads our 
statute of limitations which is 
applicable to this class of debts. 
The creditor replies that such lim-
itation does not exist in Holland, 
where the contract was made, and 
that it cannot be pleaded there-
fore in this action. But it was 
otherwise decided-once in the 
case of Justus Blenkenfieldt v. 
G. Y._ and again in an action be-
tween John J onoliin, tailor of the 
Prince of Orange, v. N. B.-both 
before the great fair in 1680. 
For the same reason, if someone 
· should sue a debtor in Frisia on an 
instrument executed before a 
magistrate in Holland, which is 
entitled there to immediate execu-
tion, but not by common right, 
it will not have the same effect 
here, but will require an examina-
tion of the facts and judgment. 
The reason is that the statute of 
limitations and execution do not 
pertain to the · substance of the 
contract but to the time and mode 
of bringing suit, which consti-
tutes in itself a quasi-contract and 
a separate transaction. It is rec-
ognized, therefore, upon very good 
grounds, that in matters of proced-
ure the practice of · the place 
where the suit is brought is ob-
served, even with respect to a 
transaction which has been en-
tered into elsewhere. This is 
taught by John a Sande, lib. 1, 
tit. 12, def. 5, where he states 
that even as regards the execu-
tion of foreign judgments the law 
of the place where the execution 
is asked is to be observed and not 
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quo fit executio, non ubi res judi-
cata est. 
8. M atrimQnium pertinet_ etiam 
ad has regulas. Si licitum est eo 
loco, ubi contractum et celebratum 
est, ubique validum erit effec-
tumque habebit, sub eadem excep-
tione, praejudicii aliis non cre-
andi ; cui licet addere, si exempli 
nimis sit abominandi; ut si in-
cestum juris gentium in secundo 
gradu contingeret alicubi esse 
permissum; quod vix est ut usu 
venire possit. In Frisia matri-
monium est, quando mas et 
foemina in nuptias consenserunt 
et se mutuo pro conjugibus ha-
bent, etsi in Ecclesia numquam 
sint conjuncti: Id in Hollandia pro 
matrimonio non habetur. Frisii 
tamen Conjuges sine dubio apud 
Hollandos jure Conjugum, in 
lucris dotium, donationibus prop-
ter nuptias, successionibus libet-
orum aliisque fruentur. Similiter, 
Brabantus uxore ducta dispensa-
tione Pontificis, in gradu prohib-
ito, si hue migret, tolerabitur; at 
tamen si Frisius cum fratris filia 
se conferat in Brabantiam ibique 
nuptias celebret, hue reversus non 
videtur tolerandus; quia sic jus 
nostrum pessimis exemplis eluder-
etur, eoque pertinet haec obser-
vatio ; Saepe fit, ut adolescentes 
sub Curatoribus agentes furtivos 
amores nuptiis conglutinare cupi-
entes, abeani: in Frisiam Orient-
alem, aliave loca, in quibus Cura-
torum consensus ad matrimonium 
non requiritur, juxta leges Rom-
anas, quae apud nos hac parte 
that of the place where the judg-
ment was rendered. 
8. Marriage also is governed 
by the same rules. If it is lawful 
in the place where it is contracted 
and celebrated it is valid and ef-
fectual everywhere, with the res-
ervation that it does not prejudice 
others; to which reservation may 
be added that its example is not 
too revolting-for example, if an 
incestuous marriage in the second 
degree, according to the law of na-
tions, should happen to be allowed 
anywhere, which is scarcely sup-
posable. In Frisia it is a valid 
marriage if a male and female 
agree t~ marry and recognize 
each other as husband and wife, 
although no religious ceremony 
was performed. In Holland it 
would not constitute a marriage. 
The Frisian spouses will enjoy 
nevertheless in Holland, without 
doubt, the rights of husband and 
wife as regards marriage settle-
ments and the rights of children 
to inherit the property of their 
parents, etc. In like manner, if 
an inhabitant of Brabant, who has 
married with papal dispensation 
within the prohibited degrees, 
should remove to this place the 
marriage will be recognized. If a 
Frisian, however, should go with 
the daughter of his brother to 
Brabant and be married there the 
marriage would not be recognized 
on his return to this place; be-
cause in this manner our law 
would be evaded by the worst ex-
amples, concerning which I should 
like to make the following obser-
vation: It often happens that 
young people under guardianship, 
desiring to unite their secret de-
sires through the bonds of matri-
mony, go to eastern Frisia or to 
some other place where the con-
sent of their guardian is not nee-
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cessant. Celebrant ibi matrimon-
ium et mox redeunt in Patriam. 
Ego ita existimo, bane rem mani-
festo pertinere ad eversionem 
juris nostri; ac ideo non esse 
Magistratus heic obligatos, e jure 
Gentium, ejusmodi nuptias ag-
noscere et ratas habere: Mul-
toque magis statuendum est, eos 
co1.1tra Jus Gentium facere videri, 
qui civibus alieni imperii sua fa-
cilitate, jus Patriis Legibus con-
trarium, scientes volentes, imper-
tiuntur. 
9. Porro, non tantum ipsi con-
tractus ipsaeque nuptiae certis 
locis rite celebratae ubique pro 
justis et validis habentur, sed 
etiam jura et effecta contractuum 
nuptiarumque in iis locis recepta, 
ubique vim suam obtinebunt. In 
Hollandia conjuges habent omni-
um bonorum communionem, qua-
tenus aliter pactis dotalibus non 
convenit; hoc etiam locum habebit 
in bonis sitis in Frisia, licet ibi 
tantum sit communio quaestus et 
damni, non ipsorum bonorum. 
Ergo et Frisii conjuges manent 
singuli rerum suarum, etiam in 
Hollandia sitarum, Domini: cum 
primum vero conjuges migrant ex 
una provincia in aliam, bona, quae 
deinceps alteri adveniunt, cessant 
esse communia manentque dis-
tinctis proprietatibus; sicut res 
antea communes factae manent in 
eo statu juris, quem induerunt, ut 
docet Sandius lib.z,decis.tit.s,def. 
IO, ubi in fine testatur, inter con-
suetudinarios Doctores esse con-
essary to marriage, according to 
the provisions of the Roman law, 
which has been abrogated with us 
on this point. They celebrate 
their marriage there and present-
ly return home. I consider this a 
manifest evasion of our law. Our 
magistrates are not bound there-
fore by the law of nations to rec-
ognize and give effect to mar-
riages of this kind. And those 
especially would seem to act 
against the law of nations who 
marry citizens of another state by 
its facility, knowing such law to 
be contrary to their home legis-
lation. 
9. Furthermore, not only are 
the marriage contracts themselves, 
duly entered into in a certain 
place, to be regarded as binding 
and valid everywhere, but the 
rights and interests also attached 
thereto by the law of the place 
where they were celebrated. In 
Holland the spouses have a com-
munity of all their property un-
less they have stipulated other-
wise in a marriage contract; this 
will be the effect with respect to 
the property situated in Frisia, al-
though the community of proper-
ty existing there is only of profit 
and loss and not of the property 
itself. Therefore Frisian spouses 
will remain the separate owners 
of their property even if it is sit-
uated in Holland. When the 
spouses migrate, however, from 
one province into another the 
property which may thereafter 
come to either will not be com-
munity property, but remain their 
separate property; and the prop-
erty which had become commu-
nity property before will retain 
the legal status which it had ac-
quired, as is laid down by John a 
Sande, lib. 2, decis. tit. 5, de£. 10, 
where it is stated at the end that 
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troversum, an immobilia bona 
etiam alibi sita in tali specie com-
municentur, quod nos affirman-
dum putamus. Ratio dubitandi, 
quod Leges alterius Reip. non 
possint alieni territorii partes in-
tegrantes afficere; sed responsio 
est duplex: prima, non fieri hoc 
vi legis alienae immediata, sed ac-
cedente consensu Potestatis sum-
mae in altera Civitate, quae 
legibus alienis in loco suo exer-
citis praebet effectum; sine suo 
suorumque praejudicio, mutuae 
populorum utilitatis respectu, 
quod est fundamentum omnis 
hujus doctrinae. Altera respon-
sio est, non tantum hanc esse vim 
Legis, sed etiam consensum par-
tium bona sua invicem communi-
cantium, cujus vi mutatio do-
minii non minus per matrimonium 
quam per alios contractus fieri 
potest. 
10. Verum i:amen non ita prae-
cise respiciendus est locus, in quo 
Contractus est initus, ut si partes 
alium in contrahendo locum re-
spexerint, ille non potius sit con-
siderandus. Cotttraxisse uttusquis-
que itt eo loco i1ttelligitur, itt quo 
ftt solveret, se obligavit, l. 2I. de 
0, et A. Proinde et locus matri-
monii contracti non tam is est, ubi 
contractus nuptialis initus est, 
quam in quo contrahentes matri-
monium exercere voluerunt; ut 
there was a controversy among 
the doctors of the common law 
whether immovables situated in 
another country were to be af-
fected in like manner, in regard 
to which question we believe an 
affirmative answer must be given. 
The reason for the doubt was that 
the laws of one state cannot affect 
the integral parts of another ter-
ritory. But the answer is a two-
fold one. In the first place, it is 
not by reason of the immediate 
force and operation of a foreign 
law, but in consequence of the 
sanction of the supreme power of 
the other state, that effect is given 
to foreign laws exercised upon 
property within its territory, out 
of respect for the mutual con-
venience of the nations, provided, 
however, that no prejudice is oc-
casioned to a sovereignty· or to 
the rights of its citizens, which is 
the foundation of the whole sub-
ject. The second answer is that 
it is not so much by force of law 
as by the consent of the parties 
reciprocally communicating their 
property rights to each other, by 
which means a change of prop-
erty may be effected, no less from 
matrimony than from other con-
tracts. 
10. The place, however, where 
a contract is entered into is not 
to be considered absolutely; for 
if the parties had in mind the law 
of another place at the time of 
contracting the latter will control. 
"Everyone is deemed to have con-
tracted in that place, in which he 
is bound to perform." (Digest, 
44, 7, 21.) Hence the place 
of matrimony is not so much 
the place where the ceremony is 
performed as the place where the 
contracting parties intended to 
live. It .happ·ens every day that 
men in Frisia, natives as well as 
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omni die fit, homines in Frisia in-
digenas aut incolas ducere uxores 
in Hollandia, quas inde statim in 
Frisiam deducunt; idque si in ipso 
contractu ineundo propositum ha-
beant, non oritur communio bon-
orum, etsi pacta dotalia sileant, 
secundum jus Hollandi~e, sed jus 
Frisiae in hoc casu est loci Con-
tractus. 
11. Datur et alia limitationis 
saepe dictae applicatio, in hoc 
articulo; Effecta contractuum 
certo loco initorum, pro jure loci 
illius alibi quoque observantur, si 
residents, marry wives in Holland 
whom they immediately bring into 
Frisia. And if they had such an 
intention at the time of the mar-
riage there will be, in the absence 
of a marriage contract, no com-
munity of property according to 
the law of Holland; the Frisian 
law \vill be the place of the con-
tract in this case. 
11. There is in this connection 
a further application of the re-
striction often mentioned: the ef-
fects of contracts made in a par-
'ticular place will be recognized 
elsewhere in accordance with the 
mlllum inde civibus alienis creatur law of the former place, if no 
praejudicium, in jure sibi quaesito, 
ad quod Potestas alterius loci non 
tenetur neque potest extendere jus 
diversi territorii. Exemplum: Hy-
prejudice result therefrom to the 
citizens of such other country 
with respect to rights acquired by 
them, and the sovereignty of the 
latter place is not bound to ex-
potheca conventionalis antiquior tend, nor can it extend, the law of 
in re mobili, dat 1rpwTo1rp~la.v another territory so far. For ex-
jus Praelationis, etiam contra ter- ample: a prior hypothecation by 
agreement of movable property 
tium possessorem, Jure Caesaris et confers 1rpwTo1rp~la.v "a right of 
in Frisia, non apud Batavos. priority," even against a third pos-
Proinde si quis ex ejusmodi hy- sessor according to the law of 
potheca in Hollandia agat adver- Caesar and in Frisia, but not ac-
sus tertium, non audietur; quia cording to the Batavians. Hence 
if someone should proceed against jus illi tertio in ista re mobili a third party in Holland by virtue 
quaesitum per jus alieni territorii of such a hypothecation he would 
non potest auferri. Ampliamus not succeed because the rights of 
hanc regulam tali extensione; Si the third party in the movable 
jus loci in alio Imperio pugnet property cannot be destroyed by 
the law of another territory. We 
cum jure nostrae civitatis, in qua may enlarge the rule to the fol-
contractus etiam initus est, con-· 
fligens cum eo contractu, qui alibi 
celebratus fuit: magis est, ut jus 
nostrum quam jus alienum serve-
mus. Exemplum: In Hollandia 
lowing extent: if the law of the 
place of contracting is contrary 
to the law of our state, in which 
a contract is also made, incon-
sistent with the contract which is 
entered into elsewh.ere, it is rea-
sonable that we should observe 
contractum est matrimonium cum our own law rather than the for-
eign law. For example: in Hol-
pacto, ne uxor teneatur ex aere land matrimony is contracted with 
alieno a Viro 'Solo contracto; Hoc the agreement that the wife shall 
237 
HeinOnline  -- 13 Ill. L. R.  414 1918-1919
414 ERNEST G. LORENZEN 
etsi privatim contractum valere 
dicitur in Hollandia, cum Praeju-
dicio creditorum, quibus Vir postea 
obligatus est: in Frisia id genu!! 
pacta non valent, nisi publicata, 
nee obstant ignorantiam alleganti-
bus justam, idque recte secundum 
jus Caesarum et aequitatem. Vir 
i~ Frisia contrahit aes alienum, 
uxor hie pro parte dimidia con-
venitur. Opponit pactum dotale 
suum; Creditores replicant, Jure 
Frisiae, non esse locum huic pacto, 
quia non est publicatum, et hoc 
praevalet apud nos in contractibus 
heic celebratis, ut nuperrime con-
sultus respondi. Sed qui in Ba-
tavia contraxerunt, etsi agentes in 
.Frisia, tamen repellentur; quia 
tum simplex unumque; jus loci 
contractus, non dupl~, venit in 
considerationem. 
12. Ex Regulis initio collocatis 
etiam hoc axioma colligitur. Qttal-
itates personales certo loco alicui 
jure impressas, ubique circumferri 
et personam comitari, cum hoc 
effectu, ut ubivis locorum eo jure, 
quo tales personae alibi gaudent 
vel sttbjecti stmt, fruantur et 
sttbjiciantttr. Hinc qui apud nos 
in Tutela, Curave sunt, ut adoles-
centes, filiifam., prodigi, mulieres 
nuptae, ubique pro personis Curae 
subjectis habentur, et jure, quod 
Cura singulis in locis tribuit, 
utuntur fruuntur. Hinc qui in 
Frisia veniam aetatis impetravit, 
in Hollandia contrahens ibi non 
not be liable for the debts con-
tracted by the husband alone. Al-
though it is a private contract it 
is said to be valid in Holland, to 
the prejudice of creditors to whom 
the husband may become later in-
debted. In Frisia such contracts 
would not be valid unless pub-
lished, nor would ignorance of 
this fact constitute an excuse ac-
cording to the law of Caesar and 
equity. The husband contracts a 
debt in Frisia and his wife is sued 
here for one-half the amount. 
She pleads the marriage contract. 
The creditors reply that by Frisian 
law the agreement is not valid be-
cause not published, and this con-
tention prevails with us with re-
spect to contracts entered into 
here, as I gave recently as my 
opinion when I was consulted. 
But those who contracted in Hol-
land, notwithstanding such suit 
was brought in Frisia, were non-
suited because the law of the place 
of contracting came into consider-
ation as the law of a single coun-
try and not as that of two coun-
tries. 
12. From the rules laid down 
at the beginning the following 
maxim may also be derived: per-
sonal qualities impressed upon a 
person by the law of a particular 
place surround and accompany 
him everywhere with this effect 
that every>vhere persons enjoy 
and are subject to the law which 
persons of the same class enjoy 
and are subject to in that other 
place. Hence persons who with 
us are under tutors or curators, as 
young men, prodigals, or married 
women, are regarded every.vhere 
as persons subject to curators, and 
will possess and enjoy such rights 
as the local law and guardianship 
bestow. Hence he who has be-
stowed upon him the rights of a 
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restituitur in integrum. Qui pro-
digus heic est declaratus, alibi 
contrahens valide non obligator 
neque convenitur. Rursus in qui-
busdam Provinciis qui viginti an-
nos excessere pro majoribies hab-
entur, et possunt alienare bona 
immobilia, aliaque jura minorum 
exercere in illis etiam locis, ubi 
ante viginti quinque annos nemo 
censetur esse major; Quia Legibus 
rebusque judicatis aliarum Civi-
tatum in suos subjectos quaelibet 
aliae potestas comiter effectum 
tribuunt; quatenus suo suorumque 
juri quaesito non praejudicatur. 
13. Sunt, qui hunc effectum 
qualitatis personalis ita interpre-
tantur, ut qui certo loco, major 
aut minor, pubes aut impubes, 
filius aut paterfam. sub curatore 
vel extra Curam est, ubique tali 
jure fruatur eique subjiciatur, quo 
fruitur et cui subjicitur in eo loco, 
ubi primum talis factus est aut 
talis habetur: proinde, quod in 
patria potest aut non potest facere, 
id eum nusquam non posse vel 
prohiberi facere. Quae res mihi 
non videtur habere rationem, quia 
nimia inde uVYX}IfTL<> jurium et · 
onus pro vicinis ex aliorum legibus 
oriretur. Exemplis momentum rei 
patebit. Filiusfam. in Frisia non 
potest facere testamentum. Pro-
ficiscitur in H ollandiam ibique 
facit testamentum; quaeritur, an 
valeat. Puto valere utique in 
Hollandia, per Regulam primam et 
secundam, quod leges afficiant 
omnes eos, qui sunt in aliquo ter-
person of age in Frisia will not be 
granted restitution in Holland with 
respect to contracts entered into 
there. In the same way he who 
is declared a prodigal will not be 
bound by contracts entered into 
elsewhere. Again, in some prov-
incel? persons above the age of 
21 are regarded as of age and may 
alienate their immovable property 
and exercise other rights going 
with majority even in those places 
where a person becomes of age 
only at 25, because whatever qual-
ities are assigned to their subjects 
by the laws and judgments of any 
state will be given effect else-
where, as long as no prejudice re-
sults therefrom to the rights of 
such government or to its citizens. 
13. There are those who in-
terpret the effect of a personal 
quality in another way. Accord-
ing to them he who according to 
the law of a certain country is of 
age or is under age, a puber or 
impuber, a house-son or pater 
familias, under guardianship or 
free from guardianship, will be 
governed everywhere as regards 
the consequence of this status by 
the very law which conferred such 
status upon him; so that what he 
can do or cannot do in his own 
country he ought to be allowed to 
do or to be prohibited from doing 
everywhere. This opinion does 
not seem to me well founded; 
there would result therefrom too 
great a confusion of rights, and 
from the laws of some states too 
great a burden for their neigh-
bors. Some examples will make 
this clear. A house-son in Frisia 
cannot make a will. He goes into 
Holland where he makes a will. 
The question is whether it is valid. 
I think it is. At all events in 
Holland, by virtue of the first and 
second maxims, because the laws 
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ritorio : nee civile sit, ut Batavi 
de negotio apud se gesto, suis 
legibus neglectis, secundum alie-
nas judicent. Attamen verum est, 
id heic in Frisia non habiturum 
esse effectum, per regulam tertiam, 
quod eo modo nihil facilius foret 
quam Leges nostras a Civibus 
eludi, sicut eluderentur omni die. 
Sed alibi tale testamentum valebit, 
etiam ubi filiisfam. non licet facere 
testamentum, quia cessat ibi ilia 
ratio eludendi juris patrii per suos 
cives; quod in tali specie non foret 
commissum. 
14. Hoc exemplum spectabat 
actum ob personalem qualitatem 
domi prohibitum. Dabimus aliud 
de actu domi licito, sed illic, ubi 
celebratus est, prohibito, in su-
prema Curia quandoque judicat-
um. Rudolphus Monsema natus 
annos XVII Grottingae diebus 
quatuordecim, postquam illuc mi-
graverat, ut pharmaceuticam dis-
ceret, Testamentum condiderat, 
quod ei in Frisia liberum erat 
facere, sed Grottingae, ait D. N atda 
Relator hujus judicati, non licet 
idem. puberibus infra XX atmos, 
nee tempore morbi fatalis, neque 
de bonis hereditariis ultra partem 
dimidiam. Decesserat ex eo morbo 
adolescens, herede Patruo, ma-
terteris legato dimissis, quae tes-
tamentum dicebant nullum, utpote 
factum contra jus loci. Heres 
urgere, personalem qualitatem 
ubique circumferri et jus ei in 
of a state apply to all within its 
territory. Nor is it just that as 
regards acts done within their 
territory the Dutch shall put aside 
their own law and decide the case 
according to foreign law. But it 
will have no validity in Frisia, in 
accordance with the third maxim, 
because by that means nothing 
would be more easy for our citi-
zens· than to evade our laws, and 
they might be evaded every day. 
But elsewhere such a will would 
be valid even where by their laws 
a house-son could not make a will 
because in such a case there would 
be no evasion of the domestic law 
by subjects thereof and the above 
reason would therefore not apply. 
14. The example I have given 
refers to an act which was. pro-
hibited at home on account of a 
personal quality. We shall give 
another act allowed at home, but 
prohibited where it was done, de-
cided sometime ago by our Su-
preme Court: Rudolph Monsema, 
who was born and lived at Gron-
ingen, when he was seventeen 
years and fourteen days old went 
abroad to learn the business of a 
druggist. He made a will which 
he could have made in Frisia, but 
at Groningen, according to Dr. 
Nauta, the reporter of this de-
cision, infants under twenty years 
of age are not allowed to do so, 
not even _at the time of their last 
illness, f6F-.:. more than one-half 
their patrimony.·· :T,he. :y.oung man 
died of tl:Ie sickness, leaving his 
uncle on JMs father's side as his 
heir and leaving nothing to his 
aunts on his mother's side, who 
contended that the will was void 
because it was made in violation 
of the law of the ·place. The heir 
urged that a personal quality ac-
companies the person everywhere, 
and that, as he could have made 
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Patria competens. alibi quoque 
valere: sed judicatum est contra 
testamentum, convenienter ei, quod 
diximus, praesertim cum heic 
eludendi juris patrii affectatio 
nulla fuisset, etsi minime con-
sentientibus suffragiis, Nauta 
quoque dissentiente. Decis. M. S. 
I34· Anno. z643. d. 27, Octobris. 
15. Fundamentum universae 
hujus doctrinae diximus esse et 
tenenius subjectionem hominum 
infra Leges cujusque territorii, 
quamdiu illic agunt, quae facit, ut 
actus ab initio validus aut nullus 
alibi quoque valere aut non valere 
.nequeat. Sed haec ratio non con-
venit rebus immobilibus, quando 
illae spectantur, non ut depen4en-
tes a libera dispositione cujusque 
patrisfamilias, verum quatenus 
certae notae Lege cujusque Rei-
publi. ubi sita sunt, illis impressae 
reperiuntur; hae notae manent 
indelebiles in ista Republ. quicquid 
aliarum Civitatum Leges aut priv-
atorum dispositiones secus aut 
contra statuant; nee enim sine 
magna confusione praejudicoque 
Reip. ubi sitae sunt res soli, Leges 
the will at home, he could make 
it abroad. But the decision was 
given against the will, consistently 
with what we have said, especially 
since there was no intention to 
evade the home law. The decision 
was, however, by no means uni-
versally approved, Nauta himself 
dissenting. (Decis. M. S. 134. 
October 27, 1643.) 
15. The foundation of all this 
doctrine we have said and main-
tained to be the subjection of all 
men to the laws of a country so 
long as they remain therein; 
whence it follows that an act valid 
or invalid from the beginning is 
also valid or invalid elsewhere. 
But this observation does ~ot ap-
ply to immovables when they are 
considered, not as to their depend-
ency upon the free disposition of 
the respective owners, but as to 
the extent in which certain quali-
ties are found impressed upon 
them by the law of the particular 
country in which they are situ-
ated; such qualities remain unaf-
fected in such state irrespective 
of what the laws of other states 
or the agreements of individuals 
may provide to the contrary. For 
it is evident that the laws appli-
cable to such property, enacted by 
the state in which the immovable 
de illis latae, dispositionibus istis property is situated, cannot be 
changed by such disposition with-
out great confusion and prejudice 
to the state. Hence a Frisian who 
mutari possent. Hinc Frisius 
habens agros et domos in provincia 
Groningensi non potest de illis owns fields and houses in the 
testari, quia Lege prohibitum est 
ibi de bonis immobilibus testari, 
province of Groningen cannot dis-
pose of them by will, because it is 
prohibited there to dispose of im-
non valente Jure Frisico adficere movables by will, for the Frisian 
bona, quae partes alieni territorii law cannot affect property which 
integrantes constituunt. Sed an constitutes an integral part of 
hoc non obstat ei, quod antea another territory. But is this not 
opposed to what we stated above, 
diximus, si factum sit Testamentum that if a will is validly executed 
jure loci validum, id effectum according to the. law of the place 
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habere etiam in bonis alibi sitis, 
ubi de illis testarl Iicet? Non 
obstat; quia Legum diversitas in 
ilia specie non afficit res soli neque 
de illis loquitur, sed ordinat actum 
testandi; quo recte celebrate, Lex 
Reipubl. non vetat illum actum 
valere in immobilibus, quatenus 
nullus character illis ipsis a Lege 
loci impressus laeditur aut im-
minuitur. Haec observatio locum 
etiam in Contractibus habet: qui-
bus in Hollandia venditae res soli 
Frisici, modo in Frisia prohibita, 
Iicet, ubi gestus est, valido, recte 
venditae intelliguntur; idemque in 
rebus non quidem immobilibus, at 
solo cohaerentibus; uti si £rumen-
tum soli Frisici in Hollandia 
secundum lastas, ita dictas, sit 
venditum, non valet venditio, nee 
quidem in HoUattdia secundum earn 
jus dicetur, etsi tale frumentum 
ibi non sit vendi prohibitum, quia 
in Frisia interdiCtum est et solo 
cohaeret ejusque pars est. Nee 
aliud juris erit in successionibus 
ab intestato ; Si defunctus sit 
Paterfamilias, cujus bona in di-
versi ( s) locis imperii sita sunt, 
quantum attinet ad immobilia 
servatur jus loci, in quo situs 
eo rum est; quoad mobilia, servatur 
jus, quod illic loci est, ubi testator 
habuit domicilium, qua de re vide 
Sandium lib. 4, de cis. tit. (VIII) 
def. 7. Sunt hae definitiones 
ejusmodi, ut a latiori explicatione 
non abhorreant, quando Statutarii 
Scriptores non desunt, qui de non-
nullis aliter existimaverint, quos 
vide laudatos apud Sandium in 
Decisionibus praedictis, quibus 
adde, quae novissime tradit Ro-
denburgius tract. de jur. quod orit. 
e Stat. divers. inserto libro de jure 
Conjugttm. 
it should have effect even as to 
property situated elsewhere, where 
it is lawful to dispose of it by 
will? No, because the diversity 
of laws in this respect does not 
concern immovable property but 
regulates wills. The will having 
been properly made, the law of the 
state does not invalidate it as re-
gards immovable property so far 
as no quality impressed upon it by 
the law of the place is affected or 
impaired. This rule applies also 
to contracts. Frisian immovable 
property, sold in Holland in a 
manner prohibited by Frisian law 
but allowed in Holland, is deemed 
lawfully sold, and this is true, not 
only as regards the immovables 
themselves, but also with respect 
to things attached to the soil, so 
that if corn growing in Frisia is 
sold in Holland according to the 
lasts, as it is called, the sale is 
not valid-not even in Holland-
although the sale of such corn is 
not forbidden there, because it is 
prohibited in Frisia and because it 
is attached to the soil and is a 
part of it. The same rule applies 
to intestate succession. If the 
decedent is the father of a family 
whose property is situated in dif-
ferent parts of the country, the 
law of the situs governs as re-
gards immovables. But with re-
spect to movables the law of the 
place where the testator had his 
domicile is applied, for which see 
John a Sande (lib. 4, decis. tit. 
VIII de f. 7). These rules are 
such that a fuller explanation 
might be given, inasmuch as writ-
ers are not wanting who think 
otherwise in some particulars, and 
who are mentioned by John a 
Sande in the decisions referred to 
above, to which add Rodenburg's 
recent "Tract. de jure quod orit. e 
stat. divers.," which is appended to 
his work on the law of husband 
and wife. 
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